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REGULATORY BENEFICIARIES AND INFORMAL
AGENCY POLICYMAKING
Nina A. Mendelsont

Administrative agenciesfrequently use guidance documents to set policy
broadly and prospectively in areas rangingfrom Department of Education
Title IX enforcement to Food and DrugAdministration regulation of directto-consumer pharmaceutical advertising. In form, these guidances often
closely resemble the policies agencies issue in ordinary notice-and-comment
rulemaking. However, guidances are generally developed with little public
participationand are often immunefrom judicialreview. Nonetheless, guidances can prompt significant changes in behavior from those the agencies
regulate.
A number of commentators have guardedly defended the currentstate of
affairs. Though guidances lack some important proceduralsafeguards, they
can help agencies supervise low-level employees and supply valuable information to regulated entities regarding how an agency will implement a program. Thus far, however, the debate has largely ignored the distinct and
substantial interests of regulatory beneficiaries-those who expect to benefit
from government regulation of others. Regulatory beneficiaries include,
among others, pharmaceuticalconsumers, environmental users, and workers
seeking safe workplaces. When agencies make policy informally, regulatory
beneficiaries suffer distinctive losses to their ability to participate in the
agency's decision and to invoke judicial review. This Article argues that
considering the interests of regulatory beneficiaries strengthens the case for
proceduralreform. The Article then assesses some possible solutions.
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INTRODUCTION

In setting policy, federal regulatory agencies regularly bypass the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) public notice-and-comment process for issuing legislative rules.' They instead
use the statutory exception for general statements of policy and interpretative rules. 2 Compared with notice-and-comment rules, the volume of these materials, which I will collectively call "guidance
documents," is massive.3 Examples range from the Forest Service's
nonbinding Directive System regarding national forest management, 4
to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circulars on
air safety, 5 to the Treasury Department's Examination Handbook on

I

See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and
the Like-Should FederalAgencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE L.J. 1311, 1316 (1992)
("[1]t is manifest that nonobservance of APA rulemaking requirements is widespread.").
2 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3) (A) (2000).
3 See Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative
Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 159-60 (2000) (discussing the recent identification of
guidances" as a legal category in American administrative law). See generally Peter L.
Strauss, Comment, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE L.J. 1463, 1468-71 (1992) (presenting anecdotal evidence of the "extraordinary volume of [informal] standard-generating
activity").
4
FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OVERVIEW OF THE FOREST SERVICE DIRECTIVE
SYSTEM, available at http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives/dughtml/overview.html

(last vis-

ited Feb. 3, 2007).
5

U.S. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULARS, http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regu-

latory.andGuidanceLibrary/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/MainFrame
2007).
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the operation of thrift institutions. 6 In response to congressional requests, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) catalogued over
two thousand guidance documents it had issued between 1996 and
1999, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the
Department of Labor (OSHA) catalogued over three thousand. 7 During the same period, the EPA issued one hundred "significant" rules
subject to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review, and the
entire Department of Labor, including OSHA, issued twenty such
rules." A recent study of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
suggests that on average it issues at least twice as many guidances as it
does rules. 9 According to another source, the FDA's use of guidance
documents continues to increase.' 0 This use of guidances dwarfs
agencies' production of notice-and-comment rules.
Guidance documents can closely resemble legislative rules, leading some to call them "nonlegislative rules."' I An agency may use
6
OFFICE OF THRIFt SUPERVISION, EXAMINATION HANDBOOK 010.1 (2004), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/422001.pdf ("The Handbook illustrates and describes,
for examiners and the thrift industry, certain standards of conduct and prudent operation
that [the Office of Thrift Supervision] views as important to the safe and sound operation
of savings associations."). See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching
Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 574, nn.69-70
(2003) (citing other examples of guidance documents).
7
See COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, NON-BINDING LEGAL EFFEcr OF AGENCY GUIDANCE
DOCUMENTS, H.R. REP. No. 106-1009, at 5 (2000).
8
See Review Counts, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchlnit?action
-init (search from "1/1/1996" to "12/31/1999" and display by "Stage of Rulemaking").
Only significant regulatory actions are subject to OMB review. See Exec. Order No. 12,866,
58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,740-41 (Sept. 30, 1993), reprinted as amended in 6 U.S.C. § 501
(2000). A "significant regulatory action" includes any action that materially alters rights
and obligations under programs run by an agency. See id. at 51,738. The GSA library
further identifies those with "economic significance," probably referring to those with
greater than a $100 million impact upon the economy. See Memorandum from John D.
Graham to President's Management Council (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oirareview-process.html. During this period, the EPA submitted sixty-seven proposed and final rules meeting this standard; the Department of Labor submitted fifteen. See Review Counts, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCounts
Searchlnit?action=init (search from "1/1/1996" to "12/31/1999" and display by "Number
of Rules and Economically Significant Rules Reviewed and Average Review Times").
9 See Erica Seiguer & John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the Food and DrugAdministration: Obligationsand Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FooD & DRUG L.J. 17, 25 (2005).
In some of the years studied, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and the Center
for Biologics Evaluation and Research issued ten times as many guidances as rules. See id.
at 26 exhibit 5.
10
See Rakoff, supra note 3, at 168 ("If we compare the mid-1990s with the late 1970s or
early 1980s, we find that the number of FDA regulations adopted each year in accordance
with the APA's rulemaking procedures declined by about fifty percent. By contrast, since
the start of this decade there has been a striking increase in the number of FDA-issued
documents intended to give guidance to the regulated industry but not adopted through
public procedures. The rate per year for the 1990s is about four hundred percent greater
than the rate for the 1980s.").
I I E.g., Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 381, 381;John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 893 (2004).
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such documents to indicate how it will implement a particular statutory or regulatory regime. For example, the EPA recently issued a
major guidance document directed at drinking water treatment
plants' handling of "filter backwash," the material released when
water is run backwards through a drinking water filter to clean it.12
The document implements a regulation that occupies less than one
page of the Code of Federal Regulations. 13 The guidance, however,
contains over eighty pages of detailed information and instructions on
what to do with filter backwash. 1 4 The EPA explicitly states that the
guidance may contain material that "go [es] beyond the minimum re15
quirements" of the statute and regulations.
This example shows how a guidance document differs critically
from a legislative rule. Besides the lack of notice and opportunity for
public comment, the EPA guidance expressly states that it is not binding on the EPA or its regulated entities. 16 Particularly since 2000, guidance documents issued by the EPA and other agencies have
contained this sort of language, which disclaims any binding legal effect and reserves an agency's discretion to deviate from the guidance's
terms.

17

With such a disclaimer, a regulated entity, in theory, need not
assume the policy will be the law, but can challenge the agency's position in a later agency enforcement action. Nonetheless, even with the
disclaimer, a policy or guidance will, in practice, prompt a regulated
entity to change its behavior.1 8 The document "still establishes the
law for all those unwilling to pay the expense, or suffer the ill-will of
challenging the agency in court."19 Moreover, if the document includes an interpretation of law, that interpretation will receive limited
Skidmore deference in court, adding to its practical impact on regu-

12

See

U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, IMPLEMENTATION

GUIDANCE FOR THE FILTER BACK-

WASH RECYCLING RULE (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/mdbp/guide_

fbrr-igfnl_06-16-04.pdf.
13 National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 141.76 (2006).
14
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 12.
15

Id. at vii.

16

See id.
Several major regulatory agencies were criticized in 2000 for failing to provide clear

17

notice of their guidances. See COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM, NON-BINDING LEGAL EFFECT OF
AGENCY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, H.R. REp. No. 106-1009, at 8-9 (2000). This criticism probably led the agencies to add disclaimers more systematically. See infra note 58 (noting that

a guidance may be judicially invalidated if an agency treats it as binding).
18 See, e.g., Memorandum of Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies 10 (Jan. 18, 2007), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy
2007/m07-07.pdf (noting that "[e]ven if not legally binding, such guidance could affect
behavior in a way that might lead to an economically significant impact").
19 Rakoff, supra note 3, at 167.
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lated entities. 20 Finally, despite the lack of formal legal binding effect,
agencies increasingly state that they will endeavor to follow guidance
2
document policies. '
This phenomenon has led to a vigorous debate among academics, 22 members of Congress, 23 and the judiciary24 regarding the legitimacy of policymaking through guidance documents. In the early
1980s, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees approved regulatory reform legislation requiring greater use of notice-and-comment
procedures for guidance documents. 25 In addition, the now-defunct
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) 26 repeatedly
recommended that agencies adopting guidance use a more public
process, including pre-adoption notice and comment for guidance
documents having a "substantial impact." 27 Congress conducted extensive oversight in 2000. Congress also directly regulated the FDA's
issuance of guidances. In the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, Congress clarified that the FDA's guidances were advisory rather than legally binding, and required public participation in some instances. 28
Congress further mandated that the FDA issue a binding set of "Good
29
Guidance Practices."
With the exception of these FDA procedures, however, no other
0
statute requires procedures for agency guidance documents.
Agency practices vary widely, from seeking no outside views whatsoever to publishing a draft guidance for comment in the Federal Register. In January, 2007, the Office of Management and Budget issued a
20 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228-29 (2001) (citing Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)). Whether interpretive rules should continue to
receive Skidmore deference is beyond the scope of this paper.
21
See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing the FDA's Good Guidance Practices and the OMB's
Bulletin).
22 See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 1; Asimow, supra note 11; James W. Conrad Jr., Draft
Guidance on the Appropriate Use of Rules Versus Guidance,32 ENV. L. REP. 10,721 (2002); William Funk, Legislatingfor Nonlegislative Rules, 56 AMIN. L. REV. 1023 (2004); M. Elizabeth
Magill, Agency Choice of PolicymakingForm, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1383 (2004); Rakoff, supra note
3; Strauss, supra note 3.
23 See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 106-1009, at 5.
24 See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
25 The Senate bill passed the floor unanimously. See S. 1080, 97th Cong., 128 Cong.
Rec. 5297 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982). The House bill never came to a vote, however. See
H.R. 746, 97th Cong. (1981). In the next Congress, similar legislation was introduced but
made little progress. See, e.g., H.R. 220, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 2327, 98th Cong. (1983).
26 Although ACUS did receive an authorization for three years' worth of funding, see
5 U.S.C. § 596 (2006) (authorizing three years of appropriations to recreate the Administrative Conference), no funds have yet been appropriated.
27 See I C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1992).
28 See 21 U.S.C. § 371(h)(1) (2000).
29 See id. § 371(h)(5). FDA Good Guidance Practices were promulgated by noticeand-comment rulemaking and are now codified at 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2006).
30 But see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000) (barring an agency
document from having any adverse effect on a person unless it is properly published).
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new bulletin providing procedures for "significant" agency documents. Meanwhile, the FAA has stated publicly on the Internet that it
will take comment on its Draft Advisory Circulars only from seventeen
listed industry organizations. 31 And judicial review of guidance docu32
ments is hard to come by.
Some commentators have responded by calling for broad use of
33
notice-and-comment rulemaking for significant policy decisions.
Despite the lack of public participation and judicial review, however,
most commentators have guardedly defended agency reliance on
guidances, arguing that the documents help agencies guide the conduct of lower-level employees. 34 In addition, as the argument goes, a
guidance document, even without participation or judicial review,
beats the alternative: no notice whatsoever of the agency's implemen35
tation or enforcement approaches.
I want to make a fairly simple point. The debate has generally
focused on those whom the agencies regulate. Scholars have largely
ignored another important component of the "public" affected by
agency regulation: regulatory beneficiaries. This Article focuses not
on the direct beneficiaries of agency payments, such as subsidies for
health care or housing, but rather on those who benefit indirectly
from the regulation of others. These beneficiaries include, for example, employees who expect healthier workplaces, consumers who seek
safer products, and those who hope to enjoy and benefit from a
cleaner environment.
The case for procedural reform of agency policymaking by guidance becomes considerably stronger once these indirect regulatory
beneficiaries are considered. Regulatory beneficiaries have a distinct
31
See FED. AViATION ADMIN., PROCEDURE FOR COMMENTING ON DRAr ACs, http://
www.faa.gov/airports-airtraffic/airports/resources/draft-advisory-circulars/#procedure
(last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
32
See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
33
See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 1, at 1312-13 (advocating notice-and-comment
rulemaking except for interpretive rules that interpret statutory language with a "tangible"
meaning).
34
See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, PublicationRules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper
Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001).
35
See, e.g., id. ("Citizens are better off if they can know about these instructions and
rely on agency positions, with the assurance of equal treatment such central advice permits,
than if they are remitted to the discretion of local agents and to 'secret law.'"); see also
Hoctor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996) ("It would be no favor to
the public to discourage the announcement of agencies' interpretations by burdening the
interpretive process with cumbersome formalities."); William R. Andersen, Informal Agency
Advice-Graphingthe CriticalAnalysis, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 595, 596-97 (2002) ("The alternative
[to informal advice]-having 'secret law' regularly applied but unknowable-has never
been thought wise in a mature legal system."); cf. Michael Asimow, Guidance Documents in
the States: Toward a Safe Harbor,54 ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 647 (2002) (noting that California
agencies have responded to strong procedural requirements by, among other things,
"keep[ing] their legal interpretations and policies secret").
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and substantial interest in the way an agency makes policy, and they
can suffer unique disadvantages when an agency makes policy
through guidance documents. Procedural reform would not necessarily condemn us to a world of "secret" agency law. If an agency's use
of guidance documents were to be subject to more rigorous procedural requirements, the agency would still face significant incentives to
make its approaches known to the public in advance.
Part I.A of this Article summarizes the debate on guidance documents to date. Part I.B discusses regulatory beneficiaries and their
relationship to administrative agency decision making. Part I.B then
analyzes the significant harms faced by regulatory beneficiaries when
an agency uses guidance documents. These include reduced access to
judicial review and the lack of an opportunity to participate in agency
decision making.
Part II discusses some possible responses. It first concludes that
neither inaction nor mandatory notice-and-comment rulemaking will
provide satisfactory solutions. It then considers a number of better
solutions, such as requiring all agencies to apply "good guidance practices" or creating a right to petition for revision or revocation of a
guidance document. These solutions offer promise for addressing the
concerns of regulatory beneficiaries.
I
GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS AND REGULATORY BENEFICIARIES

A.

The Debate to Date

This subpart sets forth three simple examples of agency policymaking through guidance documents to illustrate the basic outlines
of the debate. It then summarizes how agencies may use guidance
documents. It finally considers the effects of guidances on regulated
entities. (The changes in behavior resulting from guidance documents also effectively set policy for regulatory beneficiaries, which I
discuss in a later subpart.)
As one example, consider the FDA's Compliance Policy Guid-

ances.3 6 The FDA has the statutory authority to regulate "adulterated"
foods sold in interstate commerce. 3 7 The FDA uses guidance documents to describe what it currently views as adulterated food. For example, in 2001, the FDA issued, without notice and comment, a
Compliance Policy Guidance for apple juice with more than 50 parts
per billion (ppb) of patulin, a naturally occurring but carcinogenic
36

FDA/ORA COMPLIANCE POLhttp://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance-ref/cpg/cpgfod/

OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,

ICY GUIDES: CHAPTER 5 CONTENTS,

(last visited Feb. 3, 2007).

37

See 21 U.S.C. § 346 (2000).

HeinOnline -- 92 Cornell L. Rev. 403 2006-2007

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

404

[Vol. 92:397

mold. 38 The FDA stated that it would expect its staff to recommend
enforcement action against sellers of apple juice with patulin exceed39
ing this level.
As another example, the Department of Education's program implementing Title IX has largely been accomplished through guidance
documents, especially with respect to athletic opportunities for college women. 40 Since Congress enacted Title IX, the Department of
Education has promulgated only one notice-and-comment rule in response to a congressional directive. 41 This 1974 rule generally requires recipients of federal funding that administer athletic programs
42
to "provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes."
The rule contains an unprioritized laundry list of factors for the Department to consider when determining the presence of "equal opportunities." 43 The Department of Education has articulated its Title
IX policies in a more detailed way only in its guidance documents.
For instance, in 1979, in a "Policy Interpretation," the Department
announced a detailed set of three factors to assess compliance with
Title IX. 44 The Department has since issued several "clarifications" to

38

See SEC. 510.150

APPLE JUICE, APPLE JUICE CONCENTRATES, AND APPLE JUICE PROD-

in OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 36,
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance-ref/cpg/cpgfod/cpg5lO-150.htm (last visited Feb. 3,
2007) [hereinafter APPLEJUICE]. Consistent with its Good Guidance Practices, the FDA did
publish a notice in the Federal Register that the guidance was available and in use at the
agency. See Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug
Administration, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,836 (Oct. 24, 2001) (providing Web pages containing FDA
agency guidances).
39
See APPLE JUICE, supra note 38.
40
See, e.g., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY. THREE-PART TEsT-PART THREE (2005), available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/title9guidanceadditional.pdf [hereinafter 2005 CLARIFICATION]. Title IX is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
41
See Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484 (1974)
(requiring the Secretary of Education to publish rules implementing "the prohibition of
sex discrimination in federally assisted education programs which shall include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable provisions considering the nature of
particular sports").
42
45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (2005).
41
Id. The factors include the provision of facilities, equipment, coaching, publicity,
and accommodation of the interests and abilities of members of both sexes.
44
See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; Title
IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979), available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9interp.html (outlining three factors for
the Department to examine: 1) whether opportunities are "substantially proportionate" to
enrollment; 2) whether, if women are underrepresented, athletic programs for them are
nonetheless expanding; and 3) whether, if women are underrepresented and athletic programs for them are not expanding, women's "interests and abilities.., have been fully...
accommodated").
UCrs-ADULTERATION

WITH PATULIN,
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its policy, including guidance documents issued in 199645 and in
2005.46

Another important agency guidance document was issued in the
wake of the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.47 In that
case, the Court refused to read the Clean Water Act to authorize federal jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, nonnavigable wetlands where
the sole claimed basis for jurisdiction was the presence of migratory
birds. 48 In response, the EPA issued a legal memorandum announcing changes in its implementation of the Clean Water Act.4 9 This "up-

dated guidance" instructed field staff to refrain from exercising
jurisdiction not only over the waters described in the Supreme Court
decision, but also over any other intrastate waters not traditionally navigable without seeking prior "formal, project-specific approval" from
EPA headquarters. 50 After the 2006 Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States,5 1 the EPA further narrowed its guidance by instructing field staff to delay exercising jurisdiction over any waters that
are not traditionally navigable. 5 2 Although Congress has considered
45
OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS POLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE-PART TEST (1996), http://www.ed.gov/about/of-

fices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html#two [hereinafter 1996 CLARIFICATION]. For discussion of
this measure, see OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, CATHOLIC UNIV. OF Am., NONDISCRIMINATION
WITH RESPECT TO STUDENTS (2006), http://counsel.cua.edu/FEDLAW/TitleIXs.cfm.
In

1996, the Department indicated that compliance with any of the three prongs, not necessarily the first one, would bring the institution within a Title IX "safe harbor." See 1996
CLARIFICATION, supra.
46
2005 CLARIFICATION,

supra note 40, at iv-v (stating in a "Dear Colleague" letter that
online surveys of students would, under certain circumstances, be adequate to document
"insufficient interest to support an additional varsity team for the underrepresented sex"
allowing the institution to be presumed compliant with the third prong of the three-part
test).
47
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
48
See id. at 171-72.
49
See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1995-98 (Jan. 15, 2003).
50
Id. at 1997-98. The memorandum accompanied an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking indicating EPA's interest in revisiting its interpretation of "waters of the United
States," those over which the Clean Water Act authorizes the agency to exercise jurisdiction. See 68 Fed. Reg. 1991. EPA ultimately rescinded this advanced notice. See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA and Army Corps Issue Wetlands Decision (Dec. 16,
2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/guidance/SWANCC/index.html.
51
126 S. Ct. 2208, 2226-27 (2006) (restricting agency jurisdiction to water resources
with a "significant nexus" to traditionally navigable waters).
52
See HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water of the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Administrator for Water, United States Environmental Protection Agency, and John
Paul WoodleyJr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works), available at http://www.
epa.gov/ow/speeches/060801bg.html ("EPA and the Corps issued immediate guidance to
field staff shortly after [Rapanos], indicating that ... to the extent circumstances permit,
the field staff should temporarily delay making jurisdictional calls beyond the limits of the
traditional section 10 navigable waters .... "); see also David Loos, Wetlands: Agencies Urged to
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legislation that would bar the EPA from implementing that gui54
dance, 53 this example remains instructive.
Like legislative rules, all of these guidance documents announce
broad statements of policy that apply prospectively. As with legislative
rules, agencies have developed guidance documents to help implement the agencies' statutory responsibilities. Thus, the FDA's guidance documents are directed at consumers' food-related health risks,
the Education Department's at ensuring equal athletic opportunities,
and the EPA's at implementing an appropriately scaled water quality
protection program.
As a legal matter, each of these guidance documents is exempt
from APA notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements as a policy
statement, an interpretative rule, or both. 55 The agency is not legally
obligated to assemble a detailed record, disclose its data, prepare extensive analysis, or respond to significant comments. 56 The guidances
are not legally binding upon regulated entities, and they usually are
57
not binding upon the agency either.
Delay JurisdictionCalls in Wake of Court Decision, GREENWIRE, July 13, 2006 ("Federal wetland
regulators are being urged by their superiors in Washington to delay Clean Water Act
jurisdictional decisions in the wake of a split Supreme Court decision last month .... ").
53
See David Loos, Water: House Votes to Boost Protection of Non-navigable Waters, Wetlands,
GREENWIRE, May 19, 2006 (discussing a House appropriations rider passed in May 2006); see
also David Loos, Wetlands: Supreme Court Ruling Breathes Life into Clean Water Bill, GREENWiRE,
June 30, 2006 (suggesting that the Rapanos decision may spur congressional action to clarify the scope of the Clean Water Act).
54
Other examples abound. For instance, the FDA has used guidance documents to
suggest that pharmaceutical companies may advertise their products on television without
supplying detailed information on risks and benefits. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS

(1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1804fnl.pdf.
Several agencies
within the Treasury Department are using a guidance document to suggest means of reducing risks to consumers and to the banking industry from nontraditional mortgage
products, such as "interest only" mortgages. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional
Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006).
55
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000).
56
See id.; see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195-97 (1993) (holding that interpretive rules and policy statements do not require adherence to notice-and-comment procedures, including submission of written data by the agency).
57
Agencies generally add disclaimers to this effect. See, e.g., U.S. ENvrL. PROT.
AGENCY, PRODUCERS' COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR CAFOs, at ii (2003), available at http://www.
epa.gov/npdes/pubs/cafo-prod-guide-entire_doc.pdf (noting that the document "does
not impose legally binding requirements on any party, including EPA, States, or the regulated community"); OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDES: INTRODUCTION, http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance_ref/cpg/
introduction.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2007) ("The statements made in the CPG are not
intended to create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits on or for any private person,
but are intended for internal guidance."); Mendelson, supra note 6, at 574 n.70 (listing
other agency documents containing disclaimers).
Occasionally, an agency will take the position that a guidance document is binding as
a matter of law. See Interpretation of Medicaid Days in Medicare DSH Adjustment Calculation, HCFA Ruling No. 97-2 [Dec. 1996-June 1997 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
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As a consequence, the agency cannot base an enforcement action
solely on a regulated entity's noncompliance with a guidance document.58 So the seller of apple juice containing 60 ppb of patulin re-

mains free to argue that the FDA's position that its juice is adulterated
is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not authorized by statute. Likewise, a university remains free to argue that despite not satisfying any
of the Education Department's "three factors," it still offers equal athletic opportunities to women. 59 A court may give limited deference to
an agency's statutory interpretation in a guidance document, but the
60
court will not treat it as binding.
Nonetheless, guidance documents often have rule-like effects on
regulated entities. Regulated entities often comply with the policies
announced in guidance documents, thereby alleviating the agency's
burden of enforcement. For example, the apple juice producer may
keep patulin levels below 50 ppb to avoid FDA enforcement and the
accompanying hassle and penalties. If the penalties for shipping
adulterated foods are steep and the costs of compliance are not, the
rational juicer will not risk a challenge to the policy in an enforcement action. It will simply conform. 6 1
By the same token, universities will generally comply with the Title IX guidances. Doing so saves universities the money and time re62
quired to respond to an agency inquiry into a potential violation.
Universities may also want to maintain a good long-term relationship
with the department and to avoid negative media attention. As a reGuide (CCH) 1 45,105, at 45,105 (Feb. 27, 1997) ("HCFA ... statements of policy and
interpretation . . . are binding on all HCFA components .... ").
58
See Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1497, 1501 (1992); Strauss, supra note 34, at 816. Courts have struck down agency
attempts to bind a regulated entity through a policy or guidance because those documents
failed to conform with APA rulemaking provisions. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,
208 F.3d 1015, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir. 2000); McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d
1317, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir.
1987). But see Molycorp, Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dismissing a
petition for review of an EPA decision due to lack of jurisdiction over a claim about EPA
guidances).
59
Similarly, if a statute provides a private right of action, a consumer or regulatory
beneficiary cannot simply rely upon a showing of a regulated entity's violation of a policy
or a guidance to establish liability. See Smith v. Metropo. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d
1014, 1033 (7th Cir. 1997).
60
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-28 (2001); Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
61
See Conrad, supra note 22, at 10,724 ("At some level, any document announcing an
agency's intentions will have some practical effect of coercing regulated entities' behavior,
even if those intentions are tentative or subject to challenge before the agency.").
62
This concern is especially salient given that any citizen can initiate an inquiry into a
university's Title IX compliance with a simple administrative complaint to the Education
Department's Office for Civil Rights. See Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Questions and Answers on OCR's Complaints Process, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/qa-complaints.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
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suit, universities may seek negotiated settlements in response to Department of Education inquiries rather than risk facing formal
enforcement actions.
Meanwhile, agencies have several reasons to prefer using guidance documents to following the APA notice-and-comment procedure. First, issuing a guidance is relatively cheap compared with the
costs of notice-and-comment rulemaking. 63 The agency also retains
flexibility to change the guidance inexpensively and quickly. 64 These
increased costs undoubtedly sharpen the incentive to use guidance
documents. The agency may also hope to forestall expensive litigation over the policy's validity and avoid the possibility of an adverse
judicial ruling. Since guidance documents are generally not published in the Federal Register, 65 they are also less likely to be subject to
congressional oversight or attention in the media. As described in
more detail below, guidances have not been subject to executive oversight either. 66 In short, by issuing a guidance document, an agency
can obtain a rule-like effect while minimizing political oversight and
avoiding the procedural discipline, public participation, and judicial
accountability required by the APA. The prospect of "compliance for
less" is almost certainly among the reasons that agencies use guidance
documents rather than go through the effort of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 6 7 Meanwhile, the lack of procedural discipline can raise
63

See generally U.S.

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DRAFT 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON

6 (estimating total costs for 45 reviewed
rules at approximately $4 billion, but containing no data for the other 4,043 final rules
published during the same period). In an overview of 42 significant notices of proposed
rulemaking, William F. West calculated the average interval between the formal initiation
of research on a policy issue and the publication of a proposed rule to be 4.3 years; the
average length of the comment periods was 2.2 years. William F. West, FormalProcedures,
Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in BureaucraticPolicy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 66, 69 (2004).
64 See Strauss, supra note 34, at 808 ("The more costly it becomes to generate regulations, and the fewer resources agencies have available to pay those costs, the greater will be
the temptation to find other means to generate policy-shortcutting a desirable, even necessary public process.").
65 The only exception is a "publication rule." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000) (stating
that a rule must be published in the Federal Register before the agency can rely on it).
This statute might be better read, however, as requiring publication for rules that qualify
for a subject-related exception from 5 U.S.C. § 553. See id. § 553(a) (2000) (excepting
benefits rules).
66 See infra note 78 and accompanying text. Shortly before this piece was to go to
press, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,422, which will permit the OMB to seek
consultation on "significant" guidance documents. See infra Part II.C.4.
67 As Conrad has argued, agencies may also issue policies in guidance documents to
avoid contentious issues. See Conrad, supra note 22, at 10,725 ("Faced with politically sensitive issues of law with vocal proponents on both sides, agencies are often tempted to craft
compromise positions in guidances that are frequently 'draft' or 'interim.'"). The controversy may arise inside the agency as well as outside it. See, e.g., Richard G. Stoll, Court Strikes
Heavy Blow to "Rulemaking" Through Informal Guidance Documents, 31 ENV'T REP. 1284, 1285
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
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the risk of agency action that serves rent-seeking interests or does not
properly engage public preferences. This has led legislators and
scholars to complain about agencies' illegitimate use of guidance
documents.

68

By issuing a policy in a guidance document, an agency will forgo
some benefits it might have received from notice-and-comment
rulemaking. The agency will not, for example, receive useful information from previously unknown sources, and its decision will not be
subjected to the discipline of having to respond to comments
received. 69

An agency can have very good reasons to use a guidance document unrelated to its resemblance to a legislative rule. For instance,
an agency may simply wish to supervise its employees. Agencies rely
on handbooks, directives, and other similar guidance documents to
ensure that lower-level employees complete forms correctly and make
consistent (and thus more predictable) decisions. 70 Legislative rules
could serve the same purpose, but guidance documents allow the
agency to supply information to lower-level employees more cheaply
and without risking an outside suit based on later noncompliance with
the legislative rule. 7 ' An agency may also use guidance documents to
experiment with new approaches to implementing a program before
(2000) (describing internal disagreements within EPA over stringency of controls and use
of guidances to avoid contention).
68 See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (criticizing agency use of guidance documents to disseminate legal requirements); COMM. ON
GoV'T REFORM, NON-BINDING LEGAL EFFECT OF AGENCY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, H.R. REP.

No. 106-1009, at 9 (2000) ("[A]gencies have sometimes improperly used guidance documents as a backdoor way to bypass the statutory notice-and-comment requirements for
agency rulemaking and establish new policy requirements."); Anthony, supranote ] ;Joel E.
Hoffman, Public Participationand BindingEffect in the Promulgationof Nonlegislative Rules: Current Developments at PDA, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 1997, at 1, 1 ("[M]any agencies
have responded [to the expense and complexity of rulemaking requirements] by increasingly resorting to other, less formal methods for announcing regulatory norms and expectations."); Manning, supra note 11, at 893 ("Because [nonlegislative rules] often have the
look and feel of rules promulgated through notice-and-comment procedures, they risk enabling agencies to make an end run around that more formal process.").
69 See Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-ossfication:A HarderLook at Agency
Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667, 677 (1996); Asimow, supra note 11, at 403 ("A
rule is likely to be a better product if its drafters must consider seriously alternatives that
they might have overlooked or take account of practical problems that otherwise would
crop up only after a rule goes into effect. In addition, an agency may receive more cooperation and less obstruction from regulated interests that have had a hand in shaping the
rules within which they must function.").
70 See Strauss, supra note 34, at 842-43.
71 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981) (per curiam) (holding that
the Social Security Administration's Claims Manual is not binding upon an agency); id. at
790 n.5 (remarking that nonbinding guidance with occasional erroneous administration is
preferable to no rules at all); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrinefor the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1415-16 (2000)
(discussing administrative limiting rules).
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committing the policies to the binding, less flexible form of the legislative rule. 72 Finally, because an agency cannot realistically define and

set forth every nuance of its approach in a rule document, guidance
documents may supplement legislative rules. It would be highly cumbersome to require rulemaking every time a detail is explained or
amplified.
From the perspective of a regulated entity, however, an agency's
use of a policy or guidance document raises significant reliance concerns. Unlike a notice-and-comment rule, the agency is generally not
73
bound to comply with the statement in the guidance document.
Guidance documents sometimes contain explicit disclaimers to this
effect. Indeed, courts will rarely hold an agency to the terms of such a
74
document.
Moreover, although they may participate informally to some degree,7 5 regulated entities generally lack the entitlement they would
possess in rulemaking to participate in the guidance development
process. 76 Besides the extent of public access, the agency also has discretion regarding how much data to disclose. The agency is not obligated to respond to comments or to supply the "concise general
statement of their basis and purpose" that the APA would require for
77
rulemaking.
Guidance documents receive very limited review from Congress
and the White House. For example, guidance documents to date
72 For example, the EPA recently issued an "Interpretive Statement" stating that it did
not have jurisdiction to require a Clean Water Act permit before pesticides are sprayed
over navigable waters. See Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance With FIFRA, 70 Fed. Reg. 5093, 5095 (Feb. 1, 2005). EPA then finalized the position in a notice-and-comment rule. See Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United
States in Compliance with FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483 (Nov. 27, 2006). For a catalogue of
agency motivations in issuing these policies and guidances, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency
Self-Regulation 15-19 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
73
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
74
See, e.g., Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 789 (finding agency claims manual not binding);
Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (declining to
dismiss Labor Department enforcement action that did not conform to Labor Department
guidelines on citing companies for their contractors' violations). For additional case law
analysis and citations, see William Funk, When Is a "Rule" a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line
Between Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 659, 661-62 (2002); Mendelson, supra note 6, at 575 n. 71; see also supra text accompanying note 21 (noting increased internal and external pressure upon agencies to conform to guidance terms).
75
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for
Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REv. 277, 327-28
(2004) (discussing extensive reliance by regulators on informal interaction); Strauss, supra
note 34, at 805 (discussing Nuclear Regulatory Commission's reliance on informal
consultation).
76
See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 (2d Cir.
1977) (invalidating agency rule for failure to disclose data and respond to significant
comments).
77
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
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have been exempt from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)review normally applied to legislative rules. 78 On January 18,
2007, however, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,422, which
gives OMB the option to demand consultation with an agency prior to
its issuing a "significant" guidance document. 79 Given OMB's resource constraints, it is unclear how frequently it will exercise this option. Meanwhile, guidance documents also are not subject to
Congressional Review Act requirements. 80 While Congress can, of
course, exercise oversight of any agency action, such oversight is generally ad hoc. Congressional review of policy and guidance documents is highly limited at best.8 '
Finally, judicial review of these decisions is often difficult to obtain. If a guidance document is not signed by the head of the agency,
is a staff-level document, or states it is not binding, then a policy contained in the document may not be considered a "final agency action."8 2 Even if a court considers the document to be a final action, it
may not be "ripe" for review outside the context of a particular situation.8 3 Courts have only occasionally recognized the immediate practical effect a guidance document may have as a basis for finding the
document ripe for review.8 4 More often, courts have declined to re78 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,737 (Sept. 30, 1993). While the
OMB posted for comment a Proposed Bulletin for Good Guidance Practices in November
2005, that document does not appear to provide for OMB review of any particular guidance document prior to release. See Rachel Urdan, OMB Plan to Expand Guidance Reviews
Could Delay Key EPA Policies, INSIDE EPA EVTL. NEWSSTAND (Sept. 22, 2005).

79 See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2703 (Jan. 18, 2007). "Significant" guidance documents include those that lead to an annual effect of more than $100 million on
the economy or raise novel legal or policy issues. See id.
80 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08 (2000). Nor are guidances subject to a number of other
statutory requirements for studies, coordination, or justification, including the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000), and the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502 (2000).
81 This is partly due to the sheer volume of these documents. Moreover, the GAO has
generally noted with respect to rulemaking that efforts to increase congressional oversight
have been relatively unsuccessful. See Federal Rulemaking: Past Reviews and Emerging Trends
Suggest Issues that Merit CongressionalAttention: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciay, 108th Cong. (2005) (statement of J.
Christopher Mihm, Managing Director, Strategic Issues), available at http://judiciary.
house.gov/media/pdfs/mihm110105.pdf ("[O]ur reviews suggest that mechanisms to increase congressional influence, such as procedures for Congress to disapprove proposed
rules, appear to have been less able [than presidential mechanisms] to influence changes
in agencies' rules to date.").
82 See, e.g.,
Nat'l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689,
701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
83
See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(refusing to review a survey protocol for butterflies developed by the Fish and Wildlife
Service because the document was non-binding).
84 See, e.g.,
Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020-23 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Clean Air Implementation
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view the guidance document, especially if the agency has specifically
85
disclaimed any binding effect.
A regulated entity may, in theory, challenge the policy set forth in
a guidance if the agency uses it as the basis for an enforcement action.8 6 This is because an enforcing agency cannot rely solely on non87
compliance with the guidance to support an enforcement action.
Instead, the agency must defend its understanding of statutory and
regulatory requirements8 S-say, that apple juice with more than 50
ppb patulin should be understood to be "adulterated" under the statute. This gives the regulated entity a chance to litigate the legality and
rationality of the agency's position.
The regulated entity may rationally forgo this opportunity, however, by complying with the policy and thus avoiding an enforcement
action.8 9 The choice between compliance and challenge will depend
on just how problematic the regulated entity perceives the agency's
decision to be. If an agency decision seems truly meritless, thus increasing the likelihood of success upon judicial review, the regulated
entity may elect not to comply and will wait for ajudicial enforcement
action in which the policy can be challenged. In a closer case, the
Project, 150 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998); McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838
F.2d 1317, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
85 See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 320 F.3d 272, 278-79 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(holding unripe a challenge to EPA manual provisions requiring greater monitoring in
permits); Truckers United for Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 139 F.3d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (finding informal statements unripe); Aulenback, Inc. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 103
F.3d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 726
(1998) (finding forestry plans not ripe for review); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S.
871, 892-93 (1990) (holding the "land withdrawal review program" not a discrete agency
action ripe for review).
The court reviewed the FDA guidance document on genetically modified materials in
Alliancefor Bio-integrity v. Shalala, but apparently no finality or ripeness argument was advanced. See 116 F. Supp. 2d. 116, 171 (D.D.C. 2000) (rejecting arguments that the statement implicated FDA's exercise of enforcement discretion and was hence unreviewable).
Although the court held that the policy statement provided a "focal point" for review, it
nonetheless declined to find the guidance to be an "agency action" for purposes of NEPA's
environmental review requirement. See id. at 174.
In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit also relied on the nonbinding
nature of the EPA Manual statements to find that the statements did not injure the plaintiff in any "imminent or redressable manner," leaving the plaintiff without standing to
challenge the agency statements. 320 F.3d at 278.
86 This opportunity has led a number of courts to find that no hardship will flow from
denying review of a guidance at the outset, reinforcing the conclusion that the guidance is
not ripe for review. See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Group, 320 F.3d at 279; Get. Elec., 290 F.3d at
381.
87 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
88 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000).
89 See Strauss, supra note 34, at 817 ("[I]n some circumstances conformity may be so
simple, and the consequences of disregarding a publication rule that would be upheld may
be so severe, as to make those who learn of a publication rule unwilling to take the risk of
its concrete application to them.").
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regulated entity may weigh the costs of compliance against the
chances of success on review, the risk and size of possible financial
and other penalties (such as bad publicity), and the costs of litigating
against the agency position in the event the agency brings an enforcement action. If compliance is not expensive, for example, the regulated entity may never challenge the policy. The regulated entity's
opportunity to challenge an agency policy at the time an agency enforces it is often inferior to the pre-enforcement challenges frequently
available for notice-and-comment rules. Although a pre-enforcement
challenge does impose litigation costs, it generally allows the regulated entity to learn whether an agency policy is valid before it must
decide whether to invest in compliance. Moreover, litigation costs
may be lower in a pre-enforcement challenge to a rule because regulated entities may pool their funds through a trade association which
then challenges the rule. 90 By contrast, in the enforcement setting,
the regulated entity will usually elect individual representation.9 '
Despite these limits on agency accountability to regulated entities, scholars have generally reacted to agency reliance on guidance
documents with the guarded conclusion that this practice is better
than nothing.9 2 While a regulated entity's interests in certainty and in
its opportunity to challenge policy may suffer when an agency embodies the policy in a guidance, a regulated entity can nonetheless receive
very valuable information about an agency's enforcement plans by reviewing guidance documents. 9 3 Moreover, such documents enable
agencies to manage their numerous employees who have contact with
the public, reducing the risk of arbitrary decisions and increasing the
94
chances that individual agency employees will treat like cases alike.
Indeed, they are "important encouragements to agency regularity and
even-handedness.'"5
90 The apparent preference of trade associations for pre-enforcement challenges to
rules supports this intuition. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 855
(5th Cir. 2000).
91
Of course, the foregoing discussion assumes that the regulated entity is unhappy
with the agency policy. For reasons of regulatory certainty, the regulated entity would
probably prefer a favorable policy to be in the form of a binding rule. Nonetheless, a
favorable guidance document is clearly preferable to no statement from the agency at all.
92
See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 11, at 388 ("It opens a window on an agency's decisional process and thus enables a person who is detrimentally affected to make an informed argument to the correct staff member that an exception should be made. It
permits everyone who must deal with the agency equal access to vital information, thus
diminishing the advantage held by experienced professionals or former agency staff members."); Strauss, supra note 34, at 808 ("Citizens are better off if they can know about
[agency instructions to responsible bureaucrats] and rely on agency positions, with the
assurance of equal treatment such central advice permits, than if they are remitted to the
discretion of local agents and to 'secret law.'").
93 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
94
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
95
Strauss, supra note 34, at 809.
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Regulatory Beneficiaries and Agency Accountability

While the scholars who defend guidances have considered the
interests of citizens in their discussion, citizens are not all the same.
Thus far, my overview-as well as the scholarly debate itself-has focused primarily on those whom the agency directly regulates. However, this discussion has not adequately considered others whose
behavior is not directly regulated, but who nonetheless benefit from
an agency's program. 96 I turn now to a discussion of these indirect
regulatory beneficiaries and how they fare when agencies develop policy through guidance documents.
The beneficiaries of statutes most obviously include people who
directly benefit from government action, such as those who receive
cash or services from, say, Social Security or Medicaid. Direct beneficiaries possess the classic "new property" of Charles Reich. 9 7 Agencies
generally know about direct beneficiaries because they receive benefits either directly from the agency itself or from an implementing
state or local agency.9 8
My concern is with a different group: indirect regulatory beneficiaries that gain from government action but lack any focused or direct relationship with the agency. 99 These groups benefit from the
government's regulation of others.100 Of the countless statutes passed
96
Sunstein challenges this distinction, arguing that agency rules often create a bundle of rights and responsibilities for all interested parties. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Standing After Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. Rv. 163, 186-88,

196-97 (1992).
97
See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734-36 (1964) (arguing that
much individual wealth now comes from benefit claims against the government and that
such claims warrant a similar legal status to traditional property interests). Reich's argument was largely accepted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (holding that the
Constitution requires due process before revocation of welfare benefits).
98
See Reich, supra note 97, at 740-43 (listing kinds of benefits that entities receive
directly from the government).
99
There may also be a class of indirect regulatory cost-bearers. For example, consumers may pay higher electric bills as a result of environmental regulation of power plants,
but lack a direct relationship with government. I do not focus on this class here, but it is
worth noting that the concerns raised in this Article generally affect such a class less. The
interests of these cost-bearers are often aligned with those of the major cost-bearers of the
program, the regulated entities. That may mean they receive virtual representation in
agency proceedings and litigation. Moreover, regulated entities may have an incentive to
organize these parties to assist in lobbying before the agency or the courts. For example,
power plants and businesses in Michigan advocating for less environmental regulation of
utilities are also asserting the interests of consumers. See, e.g., Mike Johnston, State Mercury
Rule: Added Costs without Added Benefits, MiBiz, Oct. 2, 2006 (presenting Michigan Manufacturers Association argument against Michigan rule regulating power plant mercury emissions based on "significant costs for individual consumers and businesses"), available at
http://www.mibiz.com/absolutenm/templates/coltemplate.asp?articleid=9912&zoneid=
64.
100
Cf Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
HARV. L. REv. 1193, 1202-03 (1982) (describing a class that benefits when "government
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by Congress to serve the "public interest,"10' many regulatory statutes,
including those aimed at pharmaceutical safety, workplace safety, and
protecting the environment, are meant to benefit identified groups
other than those directly regulated.
For example, in response to reports of lead in Boston's tap water
and carcinogenic chemicals in tap water in Pittsburgh and New Orleans, Congress enacted the Safe Drinking Water Act, which regulates
drinking water suppliers to protect tap water users. 10 2 As another example, under the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) has the authority to ensure the quality of
10 3
American beef by regulating and inspecting beef slaughterhouses.
While these statutory schemes are intended to benefit tap water drinkers and beef consumers, the schemes rarely lead to direct interaction
between tap water drinkers and the EPA or between beef consumers
and the USDA.

10 4

Focusing specifically on these regulatory beneficiaries might implicate a number of doctrinal issues, including the question of who
could claim the benefit of constitutional due process requirements or
have standing to seek judicial review of agency actions. Each of these
issues has been the focus of significant scholarship.10 5 For example,
while courts almost automatically conclude that a regulated entity has
standing to challenge agency action, recognition of standing for regulatory beneficiaries is more recent and its scope more subject to de-

decisions are implemented against private persons through the coercive exercise of official
power"). The agency process issues faced by another category of indirect beneficiariescitizens who benefit from government spending, such as on highways, libraries, or parkland acquisition-are beyond the scope of this paper.
101
Many statutes fall within this extremely wide range. See, e.g., Egg Research and
Consumer Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-428, § 2, 88 Stat. 1171, 1171 (1974) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000)) ("It has long been recognized that it is in the public
interest to provide an adequate, steady supply of fresh eggs readily available to the consumers of the Nation."); Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 102,
93 Stat. 668, 670 (1979) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 3402 (2000)) (finding the
creation of the Department of Education to be in the public interest).
102
See Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 300(f)-(j) (2000)). See generally James L. Agee, ProtectingAmerica's Drinking Water: Our
Responsibilities Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA J., March 1975, at 2, 3, available at
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/sdwa/07.htm.
21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (2000).
103
104
Occasionally a statute will provide for an advisory committee with regulatory beneficiaries among its members. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2851-2853(d) (2000) (requiring creation
of federal scientific advisory committee on toxicological methods).
See generally Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 100. For an example of a due process
105
analysis that does consider a regulatory beneficiary's interests, see Brock v. Roadway Express, 481 U.S. 252, 262 (1987) (considering a whistleblower's interest in not being discharged, as well as his employer's interest in having the unrestricted ability to employ at
will).
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bate. 0 6 Regulatory beneficiaries sometimes have a statutory right to
enforce the regulatory regime, as with citizen suits and express and
07
implied private rights of action.
I will save these debates on standing or due process for another
day. Rather, my argument is that we should focus more consciously
on the interests of regulatory beneficiaries in the design of administrative procedures. I will not attempt a comprehensive typology of regulatory beneficiaries. However, one can fairly say that for each of the
regulatory statutes thus far mentioned, and for countless others, there
is a class of persons who obtain tangible benefits from the regulation
of others. 108 Some also obtain benefits we might view as more abstract
or ideological. For example, childless members of minority groups
might benefit more abstractly from IRS enforcement of tax code provisions revoking advantages to discriminatory schools. 10 9 Regulatory
beneficiaries may be specifically named in the statute that benefits
them. They may have fought in Congress to obtain passage of the
statute, or Congress may otherwise have suggested that the statute
should benefit these segments of the public. Alternatively, it may simply have been widely understood that the statute was meant to regulate one segment of society while indirectly benefiting another group.
For example, the statute governing the generation of hazardous air
pollution regulates industrial emitters largely for the benefit of neighbors and workers. 1 10
In the vast majority of these regulatory statutes, Congress has not
set the precise standards of conduct itself but has left it to administrative agencies to fill in the blanks.' 1 ' We already recognize the
strength of regulated entities' interests in this implementation by recognizing their constitutional standing to challenge agency action and
requiring due process before agencies impose sanctions.11 2 Moreo106 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1123 (2005); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Reich,
supra note 97.
107 See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 100, at 1202-16.
108 I focus here on regulatory statutes, but procurement and public works statutes also
have indirect beneficiaries, such as drivers on newly repaved highways and other users of
public projects.
109 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). The question of whether standing
should be expanded to encompass such groups is beyond the scope of this paper.
10 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2000) (requiring "the maximum degree of
reduction" in hazardous air emissions); id. § 7412(f) (1) (C) (requiring investigation of "the
actual health effects with respect to persons living in the vicinity of sources").
11I
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 346 (2000) (allowing the Secretary to promulgate regulations
defining adulterated levels of foods "to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection
of public health").
112
See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 315 (2d
ed. 2002) ("[S]tanding is not an issue for those who object to regulation of their own
conduct.").
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ver, statutes often grant regulated entities procedural protections beyond what the Constitution requires. We should see the interests of
regulatory beneficiaries in the way an agency carries out its mandate
as real interests, and ensure that beneficiaries too are among those
that can hold an agency accountable.
In some settings, a particular regulatory beneficiary's loss of expected benefits may not be as serious as the loss suffered by a regulated entity possibly facing fines or stringent permit requirements. In
other settings, however, such as those involving health, beneficiary
losses might be the significant ones. Consider the power plant that
emits excessive pollution, aggravating the asthma of nearby residents.
At a minimum, regulatory beneficiaries have a substantial interest-at
least as significant as that of regulated entities-in holding the agency
accountable for doing the job that Congress set before it. Why should
tap water drinkers have any less interest than water treatment plants in
how the EPA sets standards for drinking water? Why should neighbors of a power plant have any less interest than a power plant operator in how the EPA sets Clean Air Act hazardous air pollutant
standards for such plants?
The interests of regulatory beneficiaries in many such programs
delegated to agencies are undeniable and significant, and we should
ensure that these groups can hold the agencies accountable.
"[E] nforcement of public policy directives is a crucial task of modern
government,"1 13 and regulatory beneficiaries have an enormous stake
in the proper implementation of those directives.
What might it mean for regulatory beneficiaries to hold an
agency accountable? Putting this question in context requires briefly
examining the major theories of the administrative state. As a theoretical matter, scholars have struggled to locate a source of democratic
legitimacy for administrative agencies, which the Constitution does
not mention and whose officials are not directly elected."t 4 One view
is that the agency is an agent of the major "democratic" branches of
government, either Congress, the Executive, or both."1 5 This "transmission belt" model assumes that Congress has made all relevant value
judgments in the authorizing statute and that the agency is merely a
technocratic implementing machine." 1 6 This view has long been out
of favor given the reality that agencies may-and regularly do-make
113

Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-administrative Impulse, 103

MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2105 (2005).

114 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2260-62
(2001) (discussing the legitimacy of agency self-control and the "transmission belt"
model).
115
See, e.g., id. at 2272-309 (discussing agency control under Presidents Reagan and
Clinton).
116
See, e.g., id. at 2255-60 (discussing and criticizing the transmission belt model).
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value-laden policy choices.' 17 Instead, in view of the discretion Congress typically grants agencies-which renders judicial enforcement
less effective-and the ad hoc nature of congressional oversight,
scholars have increasingly relied on presidential control as a source of
democratic legitimacy for the administrative state.", As I have discussed elsewhere, presidential control can supply legitimacy for executive branch agencies only to a certain extent: presidential resources to
monitor agencies are limited, and presidential elections very imperfectly communicate the public's preferences on agency policies." 19
Some civic republican scholars have argued that agency deliberations
are legitimate because they are intrinsically democratic, supplying an
opportunity for a truly deliberative decision-making process in which
all viewpoints are effectively represented.1 20 However, the legitimacy
of these deliberations critically depends upon the agency officiating
over a genuinely participatory, rather than a skewed, decision-making
process.1 21 Similarly, neopluralists view agency decisions as legitimate
because the agency can formulate policy by aggregating information
and preferences received from a wide variety of interest groups. t22
Agency accountability is an important component under any of
these theories of the administrative state's legitimacy. In other words,
the agency must be regularly obligated to disclose and justify its actions, and the agency's authority must be limited by meaningful constraints, whether internal or external. 123 Suppose we adopt one of the
117 See Richard B. Stewart, Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. Rv.
1667, 1676 (1975).
118 See Kagan, supra note 114, at 2326-27;Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91-92 (1985); Mendelson,
supra note 6, at 580-81.
119 See Mendelson, supra note 6, at 617-19 (arguing that presidential elections are generally a poor method of discerning public preferences on particular agency policies).
120
See id. at 585; Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992).
121
See Seidenfeld, supra note 120, at 1515. Matthew Adler has critiqued these
proceduralist" civic republican and pluralist theories on the ground that they are either
purely instrumental without any independent value, or unjustified because public participation cannot transform a nonoptimal result into one preferred from the welfare perspective. See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure:A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 241, 267-88 (2000). Adler's account suffers, however, from a failure to
recognize critical practical uncertainties in the process as well as the possibility that preferences may not be well-formed prior to the deliberation, but instead may be developed
through the dialogic process. See Daniel Rodriguez, Regulatory Incrementalism and Moral
Choices: A Comment on Adlerian Welfarism, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 375, 389 (2000) (suggesting
that given regulatory incrementalism, "certain procedural forms are more likely correlated
with efficient regulation").
122
See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 87 (1992); Stewart, supra note 117, at 1712 (detailing similarities

between the administrative and legislative processes).
123 See Mendelson, supra note 6, at 577-78; see also Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276, 1284 (1984) (observing that various mod-
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principal-agent models, such as the transmission belt model or the
presidential control model. In that case, a regulatory beneficiary seeking to hold an agency accountable for a policy decision would want to
invoke the authority of Congress or the President to constrain the
agency's actions and to see that it is properly implementing the relevant statute, thus conforming to the path set by the principal. The
regulatory beneficiary might also wish to invoke the authority of the
courts to enforce an agency's compliance with various governing statutes and with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act,
1 24
including the "arbitrary or capricious" standard.
Due to serious resource constraints facing both the political
branches and the person or entity wishing to invoke oversight, however, a regulatory beneficiary or regulated entity cannot be sure of
gaining access to genuine presidential or congressional oversight.
Moreover, judicial oversight is relatively deferential. The APA "arbitrary or capricious" review standard is weak; meanwhile, courts also
defer to agency legal interpretations under Chevron,125 or less strongly
under Skidmore1 26 and Mead.12 7 Nonetheless,judicial review continues
to represent an important external check on agency action not only
because judges can demand transparency and rationality from an
agency, but also because an individual or entity-assuming it can
meet threshold conditions such as standing-can invoke judicial review more easily than congressional oversight.
Under a civic republican or neopluralist model, 128 each of which
takes an agency-centered approach to legitimacy, a regulatory beneficiary would want the opportunity to supply information to the agency
and to participate fully in the agency's decision-making process. In a
neopluralist model, participation would help ensure that the agency
considers (and aggregates) the full range of interests. In a civic republican model, participation by all affected groups, including regulatory beneficiaries, would increase the likelihood that the agency's
process will thoroughly engage relevant viewpoints and that the
29
agency's decision will thus be perceived as legitimate.
Thus, the principal-agent theories suggest that whether regulatory beneficiaries can hold an agency accountable for implementing a
els of administrative agencies are aimed at characterizing bureaucracies as being "under
control").
124 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (requiring a finding that agency action not be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law").
125 Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
126 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
127 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
128
See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
129
See generally Mendelson, supra note 6, at 585-88 (describing the neopluralist and
civic republican conceptions of legitimacy).
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particular statutory program will depend on the ability of beneficiaries
to invoke external mechanisms of control. Courts are especially important, since they are likely to be more broadly accessible than congressional or presidential oversight processes. The civic republican
and neopluralist models stress the importance of regulatory beneficiary participation, including the extent ,to which beneficiaries have access to agency processes and whether the agency directly engages
their perspectives. As the next section describes, however, when an
agency uses guidance documents rather than rulemaking to set policy,
regulatory beneficiaries suffer significant losses to all these means of
accountability.
C.

Regulatory Beneficiaries, Guidance Documents, and Agency
Accountability

The original question remains: when an agency chooses to issue a
policy in the form of a guidance rather than a rule, what are the consequences for regulatory beneficiaries? Close analysis suggests that
this choice interferes with critical tools that regulatory beneficiaries
can use to hold agencies accountable for the policy choices they
make. Regulatory beneficiaries lose significant access both to the
13 0
courts and to their ability to participate in agency decision making.
In turn, regulatory beneficiaries are less likely to view agency choices
as legitimate.
1. Loss of Judicial Review Opportunities
First, when an agency enunciates its approach to enforcing regulatory standards in a guidance rather than a rule, it will likely deny a
regulatory beneficiary the opportunity for judicial review that is eventually afforded to a regulated entity. As already noted, neither regulatory beneficiaries nor regulated entities have easy access to judicial
review of a guidance document. 13 1 Even assuming that standing to

Like regulated entities, regulatory beneficiaries may also lose access to executive
130
and congressional oversight when an agency elects to make policy through guidance documents. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
131
See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
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sue can be shown, 1 32 a guidance document may not be considered
133
final agency action or ripe for review.

The regulated entity, however, can challenge the agency policy at
the time of enforcement. The scholarly defense of guidance documents has largely turned on this eventual access to judicial review. In
the widely quoted words of E. Donald Elliott, who defended letting an
agency choose between rulemaking and taking a policy position in an
enforcement action, "As in the television commercial in which the automobile repairman intones ominously 'pay me now, or pay me later,'
the agency has a choice .... ,,134 The regulated entity will have the
ultimate ability to make the agency "pay," in the sense of compelling
the agency to mount a defense of its policy.
A regulatory beneficiary, in contrast, may never have that opportunity. Take the Clean Water Act guidance instructing EPA staff not
to assert jurisdiction over any intrastate waters not traditionally navigable without formal, project-specific approval from the agency's headquarters. 13 5 This policy was undoubtedly welcomed by regulated
entities, who could look forward to saving the costs of a discharge permit, effluent control, or of mitigation requirements prior to filling a
wetland. But allowing easier destruction of wetlands might trouble
environmentalists. Similarly, assume that the FDA's choice of a tolerable patulin level in apple juice, while welcomed by juicers, is one that
consumer groups believe inadequately protects public health. In both
1312

While many have argued that standing for regulatory beneficiaries is insufficiently

broad, see, e.g.,
Cynthia R. Farina, Standing, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW
OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 17, §§ 2.032-.033 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005);

Fletcher, supra note 106, at 255-65, a regulatory beneficiary's standing to challenge a policy statement is unlikely to differ much from the beneficiary's ability to challenge a noticeand-comment rule. However, a plaintiff may have greater difficulty making the factual
showing that the threatened injury is sufficiently "concrete" or "immediate," since that will
depend on agency adherence to the guidance, regulated entity compliance, or both.
33 See generally Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (reversing the Third Circuit's ruling that the suit for a pre-enforcement injunction and declaratory judgment that
drug regulations were invalid was not ripe for adjudication); Nat'l Automatic Laundry &
Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 694-704 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that appellants seeking a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment on the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act had a ripe controversy).
134 E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491 (1992) ("[The
agency] can go through the procedural effort of making a legislative rule now and avoid
the burdens of case-by-case justification down the road, or it can avoid the hassle of
rulemaking now, but at the price of having to engage in more extensive, case-by-case justification down the road. The central point is, however, that this is and should remain the
agency's choice.").
135
See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1997 Uan. 15, 2003). The
memorandum also was coupled with an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean
Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Waters of the United States, "indicating the EPA's interest in
revisiting its interpretation of "waters of the United States," those over which the Clean
Water Act authorizes the agency to exercise jurisdiction. See id. at 1991.
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cases, the part of the policy that concerns consumers or environmental users will be realized primarily through agency decisions not to
bring enforcement actions. Such agency inaction is generally immune from review.' 3 6 Further, if apple juice producers or other regulated entities elect to change their conduct to comply with the
guidance's terms, this will also reduce the prospect of enforcement
litigation. Again, no enforcement actions will mean no judicial
oversight.
Even when an agency seeks to vindicate its policy by filing an enforcement action against a regulated entity, a regulatory beneficiary's
ability to get a hearing on its challenge to that policy will not be guaranteed. Suppose, for example, that in the case of the EPA guidance
on intrastate waters, a regulated entity deposits "fill" in traditionally
navigable intrastate waters without seeking a permit. The Army Corps

of Engineers then brings an enforcement action. A regulatory beneficiary, such as a neighbor who boats on these waters, would be hardpressed to use this action to challenge the guidance's policy on more
isolated intrastate waters. The boater would face several obstacles.
First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) might not entide the
boater to intervention.1 37 The boater would first need to prove that
her interests were not adequately being represented by the agency, a
difficult argument because both parties would presumably take the
position that the defendant was violating the statute. Under some
circumstances, the boater might nonetheless be able to succeed by
arguing that a court decision upholding the agency's policy as valid
and nonarbitrary under the statute would impair the boater's
interests.

On the other hand, the boater would also face strong arguments
that the court could resolve the enforcement action without addressing the overall legality of the policy, that any resolution of those issues
136
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985). If a beneficiary possesses a
private right of action, however, or the statute provides for citizen suits, the beneficiary
could litigate the policy issue in that setting. See infra Part II.C.5 (discussing availability of
citizen suits). Of course, an agency can always decline to address an issue altogether.
Under some circumstances, a regulatory beneficiary will prefer inadequate agency guidance to none at all. Consistent failure to implement a statute, however, is more likely to
lead to congressional and presidential oversight.
The APA provides that any person may petition an agency to issue, amend, or repeal a
rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2000). An agency's denial of such a petition is subject to
judicial review. However, the APA imposes no time limit upon an agency's response to
such a petition. See id.
137 See FED. R. Cxv. P. 24(a) (2006) ("Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action . . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.").
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would be dicta, and that the boater's interests would therefore not be
impaired. 38 The boater might further find it difficult to assert a cognizable practical "interest" that a judicial ruling might impair, as Rule
24(a) requires. While some courts have held that any substantial interest, including an economic stake, will satisfy the rule, others have
required a showing of a "legally protected interest"-a challenging
39
showing for an indirect regulatory beneficiary.'
Perhaps the case for intervention would be stronger with a guidance document such as the FDA's patulin guidance. Suppose the
FDA brings an enforcement action to stop the sale of apple juice with
60 ppb patulin as "adulterated," and in doing so argues that any level
above 50 ppb is adulterated.140 Suppose further that consumers argue
that the statute requires the FDA to treatjuice with any level above 30
ppb patulin as adulterated. In this situation, the consumer perhaps
could successfully argue that its interests would be impaired by ajudicial ruling upholding the FDA position that anything above 50 ppb is
adulterated.' 4' Even in this case, the court might still conclude that it
could resolve the enforcement action without reaching the issue
raised by consumers.
A regulatory beneficiary could also seek permissive intervention
in this kind of suit. 14 2 Permissive intervention decisions, however, are

highly discretionary with the district court. 143 Moreover, to obtain
permissive intervention, the regulatory beneficiary would need to
138 Conceivably, the agency could argue that the defendant's apple juice contained 60
ppb of patulin, and the defendant could respond that the marketed apple juice contained
only 40 ppb of patulin. At this point, the consumer could respond that notwithstanding
the agency's position, the statute requires the court to conclude that the juice is adulterated. However, this will rarely be the case. In addition, if the agency invoked its policy in
the context of an affirmative action benefiting a regulated party-say, issuing a license to
operate a nuclear power plant or waste disposal facility-a regulatory beneficiary would be
able to intervene to challenge the guidance.
I"
Compare Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v.
USDA, 143 F. App'x 751, 753 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting "economic expectancy" as a protected interest for the purposes of intervention), and Graham v. Evangeline Parish Sch.
Bd., 223 F.R.D. 407, 433 (W.D. La. 2004) (rejecting an interest in children attending a
neighborhood school as a sufficiently protected interest to warrant intervention), with
Liberte Capital Group v. Capwill, 126 F. App'x 214, 220 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding a banks'
"vested interest" sufficient to justify permissive intervention), and Fund for Animals v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 732-33 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (allowing a Mongolian ministry to intervene as
of right in an environmental group's suit challenging the Interior Department's listing of
certain sheep as threatened rather than endangered). See generally 7C CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1908, at 271 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing
the level of interest that courts typically require).
140
See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
141
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 139, § 1908, at 302 ("[S]everal cases now have held
that stare decisis by itself may, in a proper case, supply the practical disadvantage that is
required for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2).").
142
See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (2006).
143
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 139, § 1913, at 378.
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show that it could have maintained the claim as a separate lawsuit-in
14 4
other words, that independent grounds for jurisdiction exist.
While the regulatory beneficiary could surely point to issues of law
and fact common to its claim and the enforcement action, such as
whether the agency's position in the litigation is proper under the
statute and nonarbitrary, the beneficiary might face the same threshold obstacles of proving standing and ripeness that would have impeded review of the guidance in the first place. Moreover, a judge
who perceives that a beneficiary is trying to "creat[e] whole new lawsuits" may be reluctant to grant intervention. 45 In short, even if the
agency files enforcement litigation, a regulatory beneficiary's ability to
use the suit to litigate the rationality and legality of the policy stated in
the guidance is uncertain at best.
Finally, even if enforcement actions could serve as a vehicle for
regulatory beneficiaries to attack a statute, regulatory beneficiaries will
often have a hard time learning about these actions, making them
unlikely to be able to participate in settlement negotiations. 146 When
a regulated entity receives notice of an agency enforcement action, it
may well invite support by a trade association. 4 7 However, the regulated entity is highly unlikely to invite intervention by, say, consumers
who wish to see the agency more aggressively interpret the statute it is
enforcing.
2.

Loss of Opportunities to Participate

When an agency issues a policy in a guidance document, regulatory beneficiaries also are likely to have less access to the agency decision-making process. As a formal matter, regulatory beneficiaries and
144
See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 76 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
words 'claim or defense' manifestly refer to the kinds of claims or defenses that can be
raised in courts of law as part of an actual or impending law suit ..
"); Ranchers Cattlemen
Action Legal Fund, 143 F. App'x, at 754 (interpreting Rule 24 to require "independent
grounds forjurisdiction");Jones v. Prince George's County, 348 F. 3d 1014, 1017-18 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (requiring a party seeking permissive intervention to show standing); EEOC v.
Nat'l Children's Ctr., 146 F. 3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that Rule 24(b) requires would-be intervenors to have "an independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction"). But see EEOC, 146 F.3d at 1046 (noting that circuit precedent seems to "allow[ ]
intervention even in situations where the existence of any nominate 'claim' or 'defense' is
difficult to find" (quotation omitted)).
145
See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 804 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1998)).
146
On the other hand, consent decrees entered under some statutes are reviewed for
consistency with the "public interest." See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F. 3d
1199, 1236-37 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In theory, then, regulatory beneficiaries could still challenge a settlement prior to entry on the ground that the relief obtained by the government
is inadequate.
147
Cf National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(holding a challenge brought by trade association to FTC issuance of octane ratings rule as
beyond FTC's rulemaking authority).
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regulated entities are on the same footing when agencies issue guidances. Neither is entided-as any member of the public would be if
the agency elected to use rulemaking148 -to receive agency data or an
14 9
agency response to comments on the policy.
As a practical matter, however, regulatory beneficiaries will generally have less access to agency process than regulated entities when an
agency issues a policy in a guidance document. First, it is worth noting that agencies have employed a wide range of processes in issuing
guidances. Agencies are not, of course, generally required to seek
outside views on their guidance materials, and some agencies indeed
seek none. For example, for opinion letters issued by the Wage and
Hours Division of the Department of Labor, even those taking a
broad, prospective position, the agency asks for no outside comment.1 50 Treating opinion letters as more akin to individual adjudications, the Labor Department has decided to forgo the views and
information it might have received had it decided to seek public comment or hold public meetings. Neither regulated entities nor regulatory beneficiaries can participate.
However, other agencies, including other divisions of the Labor
Department, do regularly seek outside views on significant guidances
and policy documents. 1 5 An agency may thereby hope to gather new
information or identify significant problems with the policy. The
agency may also hope to flush out any controversy or political opposition, especially from groups that can invoke oversight from Congress,
the White House, or both. By responding to such concerns in advance, the agency might avoid oversight altogether. Indeed, agencies
often claim greater legitimacy for their policies after seeking public
52
input.'
Among those agencies that do solicit public views, some will do so
for guidances in a manner very similar to notice-and-comment
148
This is not to say that a regulatory beneficiary could automatically obtain judicial
review of the agency's failure to respond to the beneficiary's comment in the notice-andcomment process.
149
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
150
See Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 259 (2000). These opinion letters represent an
unusual case. By statute, relying on the opinion letters affords a safe harbor to regulated
entities. See id. Thus, although they, like guidance documents issued by other agencies,
are generally phrased in a broad, prospective manner, they are binding in a way that other
guidance documents are not. Nonetheless, the Labor Department practices are

instructive.
151
See, e.g., Interview with Anonymous (Aug. 11, 2005) (on file with author); infra text
accompanying notes 156-57.
152
See, e.g., Memorandum of Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, supra note 18, at 15 (noting that providing public comment on guidance documents can prompt "greater public confidence in and acceptance of the ultimate agency
judgments. For these reasons, agencies sometimes follow the notice-and-comment procedures of the APA even when doing so is not legally required").
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rulemaking. Congress has instructed the FDA to develop procedures
for guidance documents; 15 3 for so-called "Level 1 Guidances," the
FDA has bound itself to publish notice of the draft guidance and in154
vite comment either in the Federal Register or on the Internet.
The National Organic Program (NOP) of the Department of Agriculture has issued a "notice" detailing a similar set of procedures for guidance documents.1 55 Other agencies have expressed a nonbinding
public commitment to reach out to a wide array of interested groups.
For example, the Coast Guard has publicly stated that it will circulate
draft guidance documents known as "Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars" to "all affected and interested parties" for "technical
and policy comments," though it has supplied no explanation of how
those parties will be identified. 56 In addition, the EPA's 2003 Public
Involvement Policy states that the policy's fundamental premise is to
"ensure that decision-making processes are open and accessible to all
interested groups, including those with limited financial and technical
resources, English proficiency, and/or past experience participating
in environmental decision-making."1 5 7 The policy encourages EPA officials to reach out through numerous methods, such as by including
all citizens that request involvement or by developing a contact list
based on a group's past expression of interest.1 58 On the other hand,
the EPA has not clearly defined a set of actions outside of rulemaking
to which the policy will apply, noting only that it will seek outside comment when the Administrator or other top officials determine that a
particular action "warrant[s] public participation." 159 None of these
procedures is identical to notice-and-comment rulemaking. For example, none of the agencies thus far have committed to respond to
public comments, as the APA requires for notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Nonetheless, these measures represent real efforts to engage the public on proposed policies.
See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
See Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(g) (ii) (2006).
155
See National Organic Program: Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents, 70 Fed. Reg. 5129, 5131 (Feb. 1, 2005) ("For example, these [Good Guidance Practices] provide that the public will have an opportunity to comment on and suggest areas
for guidance development or revision and to submit draft guidances for possible adoption
by the program."). Whether the procedures legally bind the agency is unclear. Compare id.
at 5131 (noting that agency will "adhere" to the procedures), with id. at 5133 (describing
"appeal" process through agency supervisory ranks with no mention of judicial review).
156
CoAsT GuARD, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NVIC FLOWCHART, available at http://
www.uscg.mil/hq/g%2Dm/nvic/NVIC%20Flowchart.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
157
OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON., & INNOVATION, U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT POLICY OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 1 (2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/reg3wcmd/ca/pdf/public-involvement-policy.pdf [hereinafter PUB153

154

LIC INVOLVEMENT].
158

159

See id. at 8.
Id at 3.
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Agencies may be prompted to make more such efforts by the new
OMB Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, which was issued
in January, 2007, and which is not yet in effect.' 60 That bulletin directs agencies to gather comments (though agencies are generally not
directed to respond to comments) prior to issuing "significant" guidance documents, particularly those with a greater than $100 million
161
annual effect upon the economy.

Very often, however, agencies do not solicit comment widely, but
instead make ad hoc decisions regarding to whom a draft guidance
document will be "floated." Peter Strauss has described the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's process of guidance development when he
served as general counsel: "[T]hese guidance instruments, which the
Commission expected to be the product of informal consultation by
responsible staff with affected parties, were supervised by the Commission in only a general way."'1 6 2 Agency officials tend to reach out to
organizations that have already frequently communicated with the
agency. One agency reportedly lists organizations that have recently
commented on significant rulemaking on related issues and uses that
as a starting point for public outreach. 16 3 In the words of another
agency employee who was sometimes responsible for soliciting outside
comment on guidance documents, "I had a list of people I'd already
met at other meetings."' 64 An employee from another agency stated
that after attending meetings on a particular issue, he would "become
aware of which [national, Washington, D.C.-based] organizations were
focused on issues."' 165 Again, however, this process is often highly arbitrary. In the words of another former employee, "Some groups
might have greater access to meetings than others based on connec16 6
tions to those in positions of authority."
Even among regulated entities affected by a proposed agency policy, there may be wide variation in involvement. Seiguer and Smith
interviewed industry representatives in a study of FDA guidance document development and found that some representatives felt closed
out of the process, finding it "opaque."'1 67 Meanwhile, other inter160 See Memorandum of Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 18, at 1 (providing that bulletin will be effective 180 days after bulletin's
publication in the Federal Register). The new bulletin is discussed in greater detail below.
See infra Part II.C.4.
161
Memorandum of Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
supra note 18, at 15.
162
Strauss, supra note 34, at 805.
163
See Interview with Anonymous (Aug. 11, 2005) (on file with author).
164
Interview with Anonymous (Sept. 22, 2005) (on file with author).
165
Interview with Anonymous (Sept. 23, 2005) (on file with author).
166
Interview with Anonymous (Jan. 17, 2006) (on file with author).
167
See Seiguer & Smith, supra note 9, at 30.
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viewees found FDA staff to be "very responsive" and felt that merely
168
picking up the phone would afford them easy access.
Agency participation decisions sometimes formally and expressly
give advantages to regulated entities compared with other members of
the public. For example, the FAA has adopted an exclusionary approach in its development of "advisory circulars," a major category of
guidance documents concerning aviation safety. The FAA has posted
on the Internet a list of seventeen associations of regulated entities
and related businesses from which it welcomes comments on draft advisory circulars. t 69 The FAA's posting states, "[W]e generally accept
comments only from recognized industry organizations. If you would
like to comment on a Draft Advisory Circular, please submit your com170
ments to one of the organizations listed below, as appropriate.'
The FAA list does not include any airplane passenger or consumer
safety organizations.' 7 1 Similarly, despite the EPA policy document
discussed above,172 the EPA's position on compliance guides for small
entities is that it will circulate those guidance documents only to small
17 3
business representatives, not others.
The FDA's Good Guidance Practices rule also creates asymmetrical public participation. The FDA has formally committed to seek
public input before issuing so-called Level 1 guidances, which are directed primarily to regulated industry and which set forth initial interpretations of statutory or regulatory requirements, address unusually
complex or controversial issues, or set forth changes in interpretation
or policy that are of more than a minor nature. 1 74 In general, the
FDA will publish draft guidances of this sort in advance of finalizing
168

See id.

169

FED.

170

Id.

AVIATION ADMIN.,

supra note 31.

171
For example, the FAA list omits the International Aviation Safety Association,
whose Web site can be found at http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/menu/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 3, 2007).
172 See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
173

See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVISED INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR EPA RULEWRITERS:

ACT AS AMENDED BY THE SMALL BUSINESS REGULATORY ENFORCEACT, at 61 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/sbrefa/documents/
iguid99.pdf ("Small entity representatives should typically be involved in reviewing the
draft compliance guide after the rule is promulgated so that we have the benefit of their
comments and advice in preparing the final version of the guide. Generally, draft compliance guides should not be released to outside parties prior to the rule's promulgation.").
But see KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 344 (1986) (citing a study documenting "hostility toward business among the
occupational safety and health professionals at the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration").
174
See Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F.R. 10.115(c) (2006) (defining Level 1 guidances); 21 C.F.R. 10.115(g) (1) (setting forth procedures for Level 1 guidances). See also
the Food and Drug Administration's Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 8961, 8968 (Feb. 27, 1997) (discussing FDA approach).
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
MENT FAIRNESS
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them, except where those documents are "presenting a less burdensome policy that is consistent with public health."' 175 One can imagine
that for some "less burdensome" policies, regulatory beneficiaries
might have something to say on whether the policy is consistent with
public health.
The NOP has followed the FDA's lead, both by systematizing public participation in guidance development and by stating that it generally will not seek advance public input on a significant guidance if the
"guidance presents a less burdensome policy that is consistent with
176
the purposes of the Act and implementing regulations."
Even without overtly excluding regulatory beneficiaries, as the
FAA appears to do, regulatory agencies that consult only ad hoc on
draft guidance documents will likely deemphasize participation by
regulatory beneficiaries. This is for straightforward reasons wholly unrelated to "capture" of agencies by interest groups (though capture, if
present, could worsen such lack of access) 77 First, because an agency
will often directly interact with regulated entities, the agency is more
likely to know the identities of regulated groups. Given time and resource constraints upon the agency, it is more convenient and less
expensive to reach out to these known entities as a sounding board for
policy development. 78 Second, the agency may have a greater interest in maintaining a good long-term relationship with regulated entities because it must constantly deal with them and because it has an
interest in procuring their compliance with the statutory regime.
Meanwhile, the agency may lack a direct relationship with regulatory
beneficiaries. Therefore, an agency official may have greater difficulty
identifying the appropriate groups or individuals to contact and less
interest in maintaining a long-term relationship with these groups.
Third, regulated entities are likely to have valuable informationoften superior to that of the agency-regarding the policy's costs and
feasibility. 179 In contrast, while regulatory beneficiaries may have valuable information on a policy's effects, they are likely to have less infor175 The Food and Drug Administration's Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance
Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8968.
176
National Organic Program: Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents, 70 Fed. Reg. 5129, 5131 (Feb. 1, 2005).
177
For a discussion of agency capture, see generally Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory
and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997).
178
See West, supra note 63, at 70 ("[Public] participation [in pre-rulemaking agency
discussions] was bounded by administrators' past experience and by their sense of who the
significant players were.").
179
See, e.g., CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE
LAW AND MAKE POICY 189 (3d ed. 2003) (noting that agencies may seek information from
interest groups "especially when dealing ... with production processes and technology or
business practices").
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marion regarding feasibility. Consequently, regulators may emphasize
informal interaction with regulated entities. 8 0
Further, certain characteristics of regulatory beneficiaries may
lead them to be less involved in policy development. First, learning
about the existence of guidances before they are finalized can be difficult and expensive unless the agency chooses to give public notice or
else initiates contact. Regulatory beneficiary groups may have fewer
resources to devote to this sort of information gathering.1 8' Second, if
regulatory beneficiary groups are diffuse or poorly organized, they
may face significant obstacles to organizing in a way that fully represents their interests. Consider, for example, any statute passed to benefit the "public health and welfare," such as air and water quality
regulation, automobile or food safety regulation, consumer product
legislation, or toxic substances legislation. The intended beneficiaries
of these statutes represent extraordinarily large and diffuse groups,
including not only those who currently benefit from these laws but
also many who cannot yet self-identify (such as future asthma sufferers, in the case of air quality regulation, or fetuses, in the case of toxics
and food safety regulation). Beginning with Mancur Olson's work,
there is an enormous literature on the organizational difficulties these
groups face; the literature suggests these groups will have a relatively
difficult time-given the extent of their interest-obtaining information about agency actions and participating fully in the agency decis2
sion-making process.
Third, regulatory beneficiaries may lack the political clout that
might otherwise motivate an agency to seek their approval. 8 3 They
180 See Coglianese, Zeckhauser & Parson, supra note 75, at 327-28 (noting that advisory
committees give "regulators and industry representatives opportunities to ... build relationships that can lead to productive informal interaction" and arguing that this informal
interaction provides superior opportunities for regulators to gather information from regulated entities). See generally SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 173, at 331 (discussing the

extent to which "interest organizations [may] provide agency staff with policy ideas and
useful technical information, including forecasts and policy analyses . . .facilitat[ing] an
easy two-way flow of information ... [and] the development of mutual trust").
181
182

See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 173, at 171-72.
See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE Locic OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 5-65

(1971);

SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 173, at 171-72;JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZA-

TIONS 33-35 (1973) (describing incentives, including solidarity and purposive, that may
cause individuals to join groups); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 366-70 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (describing circumstances under
which groups are likely to organize).
Moreover, even when formed, these groups may not represent the wide range of views
present in the general public. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, LINKING CITIZENS TO

GOVERNMENT 266 (1992) ("The claim that there exists a brave new world of organizations
that constitutes a strong, countervailing representation of the public will must be viewed

with considerable hesitancy.").
183

See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 173, at 357 ("Organized interests enjoy influ-

ence in bureaucratic decision making not because agencies are captive to organized
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may be less able to invoke political oversight mechanisms such as
OMB review or congressional oversight. 8 4 For example, when Congress considered proposals to reform the environmental statute relating to hazardous waste cleanup in the 1990s, companies lobbying to
weaken the law "outnumber[ed] environmental groups by 30 to 1."185
The point here is not that regulatory beneficiary groups completely
lack resources or political clout, but simply that their resources may
not correspond to the breadth and depth of their interests in a particular agency action. Finally, regulated entities may have more to lose
and more to spend than regulatory beneficiaries, giving them both a
18 6
greater incentive and a greater ability to participate in the process.
Schlozman and Tierney's systematic study of organized interest
groups documents that "the pressure community is heavily weighted
in favor of business organizations . . . at the expense of two other
kinds of organizations: groups representing broad public interests and
groups representing the less advantaged."1 87 Subsequent studies suggest that businesses and trade associations dominate contacts with
agencies during rulemaking over environmental and transportation
issues. 188
Similarly, while EPA officials are careful to include environmentalists whenever they contemplate issuing a significant policy change
in a guidance, they may call only the representatives of a Washington,
D.C.-based organization that has previously expressed interest, rather
than posting the guidance publicly or contacting a wide range of environmental groups. 189 Again, this decision appears to be made on an
ad hoc basis. In addition, the lack of advance public notice is likely to
groups but because agencies need their support and know that the most important weapon
in the arsenal of organized interests is the ability to make trouble for bureaucrats.").
184 Admittedly, the same problem may exist with respect to notice-and-comment
rulemaking. In that case, however, the agency has an enforceable obligation to respond to
any significant comment submitted during the rulemaking process, whether or not the
commenter possesses political clout.
185 See Bill McAllister, Gunsfor Hire, WASH. PosT, June 18, 1998, at A23 (quoting a U.S.
Federal Advocacy Office of the State Public Interest Research Groups report stating that
only five environmental groups were working to strengthen the law, compared with 150
lobbying firms and in-house corporate lobbyists, paid for by ninety-nine companies).
186
See KERWIN, supra note 179, at 182 ("As James Q. Wilson has noted, people are more
likely to get involved in politics and government decision making to save something that is
threatened than to gain something new.").
187
See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 173, at 68.
188 See KERWIN, supra note 179, at 182-83 (summarizing relevant studies but also noting
reasons that groups representing other interests may now be finding a foothold); id. at 184
(summarizing an agricultural marketing order program finding participation by "ultimate
consumers" in product-safety standard setting to be "nominal at best").
189
The public involvement policy described above, supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text, is not to the contrary. That policy leaves it to staff to "exercise judgment" in
"designing public involvement," including "[i]dentify[ing] the interested and affected
public." PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT, supra note 157, at 5-6.
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particularly disadvantage highly interested individuals or very small organizations that represent only a subset of regulatory beneficiaries.' 90
These concerns may well affect the content of a guidance document. If the agency hears from a wider variety of regulatory beneficiaries, it might respond to the intensity of their views or receive new
information. Without outside involvement, the agency's value choices
might be less responsive to public values or not engage them at all.' 91
For example, in 2003, the EPA proposed a guidance that would permit wastewater treatment plants to "blend" partially treated sewage
with fully treated sewage in "wet weather,"' 92 a measure that would
save the plants, and the cities that owned them, many millions of dollars without violating permit limits for wastewater. However, the EPA
did not informally "float" the guidance but instead published a draft
guidance for comment. 9 3 After receiving 98,000 comments, including a strong response from environmental public interest groups that
expressed concern that discharged water would have higher levels of
viruses and parasites, the EPA decided in 2005 not to finalize the
guidance.

1

94

Similarly, when a rule is published for notice and comment, an
agency may receive comments from "interested individuals in the hinterland," in one official's words. 9 5 These individuals may happen to
know a lot about the subject matter of the proposed rule, but the
agency would not otherwise have known to contact them. For example, when the EPA published a recent rule on sewage treatment for
comment, one set of comments received from an individual was so
valuable that the agency decided to fly the person, who turned out to
be the engineer operating a small water treatment plant, to agency
offices to give agency staff more specific feedback on small-system
needs. 196 The agency may forgo such opportunities for constructive
190

See, e.g., infranote 196 and accompanying text (describing an individual who filed a

public comment on a water treatment rule and then became intrinsically involved in the

agency decision-making process).
191

See Mendelson, supra note 6, at 586 (discussing agency-centered conceptions of po-

litical
legitimacy).
192
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit Requirements
for Municipal Wastewater Treatment Discharges During Wet Weather Conditions, 68 Fed.

Reg. 63,042 (proposed Nov. 7, 2003).
193
See id.
194 Another possibility is that the agency correctly anticipated controversy over this
policy, and thus decided to offer it for public comment. For less controversial, more runof-the-mill policies, public comment might make little difference in outcome and thus
might constitute a waste of agency resources. This is one reason I advocate permitting
citizens to initiate a dialogue with the agency through a petition process rather than requiring a comment process for every significant statement of policy. See infta Part II.C.1.
195 Interview with Anonymous, supra note 164.
196

See id.
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input when it formulates a policy in a guidance document rather than
a rule.
Apart from potentially less favorable policy, lack of involvement
creates other costs for regulatory beneficiaries. If one sees the administrative process as an important civic republican substitute for other
forms of democratic dialogue, such as election-related deliberation,
regulatory beneficiaries may feel excluded from the community of debate. Because of this inability to have their views heard in the decision-making process, regulatory beneficiaries may perceive a
97
particular policy decision as illegitimate.1
In short, when agencies issue their policies in the form of guidance documents rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking, regulatory beneficiaries lose significant access to judicial review as well as
opportunities to participate directly in agency decision making.
These are some of regulatory beneficiaries' most valuable tools for
holding an agency accountable. Accordingly, some reform of agency
process is warranted. 198
II
SOME SOLUTIONS

Both regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries suffer costs
when an agency issues a particular policy in a guidance document
rather than a rule. Regulatory beneficiaries suffer distinct costs, however, because they have less access to judicial review and typically also
have less access to agency processes. So, what is the solution?
Rather than advocating a single solution, I now examine two prevailing proposals and then turn to other, more promising alternatives.
197
See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Formal and AssociationalAims in ProceduralDue Process,
in NoMos XVIII: DUE PROCESS 126, 126-29 (. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.
1977). See generally Lawrence H. Tribe, StructuralDue Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269
(1975) (arguing that individual involvement in judicial decision-making processes increases the perceived legitimacy of judicial decisions).
198
Under some circumstances, regulatory beneficiaries might conceivably prefer the
unregulated issuance of guidances. For example, suppose that agency employees, unconstrained by judicial or political oversight, would tend to favor regulatory beneficiary interests. In that case, increasing the cost of issuing guidance documents would mean fewer
actions that benefit regulatory beneficiaries. Meanwhile, if greater legal constraints were
imposed, they might mostly empower regulated entities to influence the direction of
agency decision making. As the text discusses, the prospect that guidance documents will
regularly favor regulatory beneficiaries seems unlikely because of the procedural disadvantages faced by regulatory beneficiaries and the significant incentives agencies have to respond to regulated entity concerns. Bagley and Revesz also argue strongly against the
possibility that agencies will be "overzealous" in pursuing their regulatory goals. See
Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM.
L. REv. 1260, 1286 (2006). If guidance documents did tend to be relatively favorable to
regulatory beneficiaries compared with policies issued through rulemaking, however, regulatory beneficiaries would undoubtedly be less interested in procedural reform.
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The two prevailing proposals are to allow the unregulated issuance of
guidance documents or to subject all guidance documents to noticeand-comment rulemaking. Each proposal seems unsatisfactory. The
proponents of allowing agencies to issue guidance documents unchecked incorrectly assume that the alternative is a world of "secret
law"; the second proposal suffers because of the disadvantages of reducing every feature of agency implementation to a rule. Among
more promising alternatives are proposals to permit citizens to petition an agency to revise or repeal a guidance document, along the
lines of section 553(e) of the APA; 199 to require guidance documents
to be treated as precedent; and, as the OMB has begun to do in limited settings, to require agencies to adhere to "good guidance
20 0
practices."
A.

The No-Action Alternative

A number of commentators have advocated against further procedural regulation of guidance documents. 20 1 Although the use of
guidance documents clearly has costs for both regulated entities and
regulatory beneficiaries, these commentators fear that the sheer cost
of notice-and-comment proceedings would deter agencies from publishing anything on the implementation of their programs. Strictly
regulating guidance documents might thus deprive the public of valuable information. As the argument goes, a world with guidance documents, whatever the resulting injury to procedural fairness, social
goals, or reliance interests, is still superior to a world of "secret law,"
completely ad hoc decision making, or adjudication. 20 2
With respect to regulated entities, it seems likely that if the FDA
has adopted a de facto policy on patulin in apple juice, or if the Education Department has adopted a de facto policy on Title IX compliance, then an apple juice producer or university would prefer to know
the policy before the agency files an enforcement action. Regulatory
beneficiaries would seem to be in the same position. This may have
been Congress's view when it enacted 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) as part of

199

5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2000).
See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
201
See, e.g., Andersen, supra note 35; Strauss, supra note 34.
202
See, e.g., Manning, supra note 11, at 930; Strauss, supra note 34; see also Am. Mining
Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[T]he
ability to promulgate such rules, without notice and comment, does not appear more hazardous to affected parties than the likely alternative ....
[Congress's purpose] is not advanced by . . . driv[ing] agencies into pure ad hocery-an ad hocery, moreover, that
affords less notice, or less convenient notice, to affected parties.").
200
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the Freedom of Information Act, barring an agency from relying on
2 3
an unpublished document in dealing with a private party. 0

However, this risk of loss from agency policymaking in secret is
almost certainly overstated. Even if guidance documents and policy
statements were somehow off-limits to agencies, or if agencies were
required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking to issue them, a
world of secret law would be highly unlikely. Despite the cost of enhanced procedures, agencies face other very significant incentives to
go public with their policies.
First, simple good-government concerns may motivate an agency
to make its positions public. An agency head may wish to treat regulated entities fairly-or at least to be perceived as treating them
fairly-and thus to give the public notice of the agency's plans. Alternatively, congressional directives, such as statutes concerned with
small-entity compliance, may motivate or even require agency employees to make positions public. 20 4 Thus, even the rationally cost-minimizing agency will face significant incentives to issue its policies
publicly even if the agency could not issue guidance documents.
Perhaps more importantly, an agency's failure to disclose its policy positions or interpretations would likely undermine its relations
with regulated entities, which strongly prefer to operate in an atmosphere of certainty. In some settings, the agency will face pressing de20 5
mands from regulated entities for advance notice of its policies.
Agency officials typically like relations with regulated entities to remain cordial, not only because they frequently interact with regulated
entities, but also because those entities can be a critical source of information. 20 6 Further, if they are well-organized, regulated entities
20 7
may be able to invoke political discipline against agency action.
Even in less urgent settings, failing to disclose policy positions in advance may alienate members of Congress concerned with compliance
208
assistance.
203
Strauss, supra note 34, at 806 ("[Congress] was aware of the importance of publication rule practice and chose only the requirement of publication as its legislative response;
putting an end to secret law, not additional proceduralization, was its aim.").
204
See, e.g., Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2000).
205. See Manning, supra note 11, at 930 ("[W]here the regulatory stakes are high and
the demand for advance technical specifications is urgent (e.g. nuclear power plant licensing), an agency may feel obliged to set forth the needed specifications in a meaningful way
in advance of a licensing proceeding.").
206
See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An EmpiricalInvestigation,
70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821, 834 (2003) (describing informational "capture" hypotheses).
207
See Stewart, supra note 117, at 1712.
208
Congress will sometimes pass compliance assistance measures in statutes addressed
to agencies. See, e.g., Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 801 (C) (2) (A) (2000); see also Seiguer & Smith, supra note 9, at 19 n.9 (citing this statute
as a reason small businesses have more influence in the development of regulations).
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Finally, secrecy may cost an agency in court. Under some circumstances, the failure to disclose a particular interpretation of a statute
or regulation will interfere with an agency's ability to obtain penalties
for statutory or regulatory violations. 20 9 A number of circuit court decisions have held that due process bars agencies from imposing penalties, refusing to grant licenses, or taking action resembling a forfeiture
based on a statutory or regulatory violation (including injunctions requiring the expenditure of money) unless the regulated entity had
clear notice of the conduct required. 2 10 Under this precedent, the
regulated entity must know with "ascertainable certainty" based on
public agency statements that its conduct was regulated. 21' Courts
have been willing to accept public notice from an agency not only in a
notice-and-comment rule but also in a guidance document. 212 However, if guidance documents become less attractive to agencies, due
process will still serve as a powerful incentive for agencies not to hide
their enforcement approaches.
In short, agencies are unlikely to relegate all their policies to secrecy if guidance documents become more heavily regulated. This
intuition is confirmed by the fact that agencies issue guidance documents publicly announcing their policies even when they are not required to do so. While it is surely less expensive than issuing noticeand-comment rules, guidance development can also require significant agency resources. An agency may need to develop data to issue
the guidance-such as the health effects of patulin-or conduct a significant internal dialogue before arriving at a final position. Yet an
agency may proceed to issue the guidance because of the substantial
benefits of publicizing its position, even in a way that does not bind
regulated entities. Many of the same incentives that drive agencies to
issue guidance documents would still prompt them to do so-or even

209

See generally Kieran Ringgenberg, Comment, United States v. Chrysler: The Conflict

Between Fair Warning and Adjudicative Retroactivity in D.C. Circuit Administrative Law, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 914 (1999) (exploring tensions between due process doctrine and the doctrine permitting retroactive effects of adjudications).
210 See, e.g., Excel Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 397 F.3d 1285, 1298 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding that fair notice requirements did not apply to a cease-and-desist order); SBC
Commc'ns v. FCC, 373 F.3d 140, 147-51 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding FCC enforcement
because SBC had fair notice of its policy); WHX Corp. v. SEC, 362 F.3d 854, 859-61 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (invalidating a cease-and-desist order because of lack of fair warning of the
SEC's interpretation of a rule); Trinity Broad. of Fla. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 618, 628 (D.C. Cir.
2000); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (barring recall
of cars with a particular seat belt anchor); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1332 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
211
See Gen. Elec., 53 F.3d at 1329; Ringgenberg, supra note 209, at 925 (citing the D.C.
Circuit's position that pre-enforcement efforts to obtain compliance can also satisfy the
notice requirement).
212 See Gen. Elec., 53 F.3d at 1329.
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to issue rules-if agency use of guidance documents were more heavily regulated.
Of course, these incentives will not cause an agency to reissue
every guidance as a rule. Rulemaking is not cheap. If guidance documents are unavailable to the agency, rulemaking's cost and loss of administrative flexibility might lead an agency to publicly state its
policies less often or in less detail. If due process does not require a
public statement of agency position, if Congress is not particularly interested, or if the agency is uninterested in maintaining positive relations with regulated entities, the agency may not invest resources in
issuing helpful information. An agency that focuses more on projects,
such as highway building, rather than enforcement of statutory or regulatory standards, may also face fewer incentives to use rulemaking to
set policy.
It is difficult to predict which guidances would be lost if all guidance development required meeting rulemaking standards. An
agency surely would issue fewer policies that are legally indefensible
or highly controversial. On the other hand, regulated entities would
continue to demand certainty regarding the sort of conduct that
might lead to enforcement action; those demands would likely
prompt agencies to continue publishing this information.
In any event, the argument that policies, guidances, and interpretive rules are better than nothing2 13 fails to resolve the question of
whether we should regulate the agency issuance of guidance documents. Even if an agency faces higher costs in issuing guidance documents, it surely will not completely hide its policy positions.
Meanwhile, the argument fails to take account of the costs that the
unregulated use of guidance documents imposes on regulatory
beneficiaries.
B.

Requiring Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking

So, should the other oft-proposed reform be the solution? That
is, should an agency be required to issue every significant aspect of its
policies in the form of a notice-and-comment rule, as Anthony has
advocated? 2 14 Although this approach would give regulatory beneficiaries full participation rights in agency decision making and make
agency positions legally binding, this position also has an underlying
flaw: an agency cannot and probably should not attempt to fully specify its policies. As already noted, the high cost of rulemaking could
213 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
214 See Anthony, supra note 1. Anthony's position includes an exception for agency
interpretations that do not add any substantive terms to an underlying rule or statute.
However, distinguishing a "nonsubstantive" interpretation from one that has a substantive
effect would be difficult at best.
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lead to less information from the agency about its policies (though, as
I argue, it would not leave us with a world of secret law and ad hoc
adjudication). 21 5 Moreover, an agency cannot reasonably be expected
to foresee every possible instance in which its policy may be applied.
For the unforeseen or unforeseeable case, it may be desirable for an
2 16
agency to retain flexibility to design just results.

Further, such an approach, as others have observed, would raise
issues of judicial competence. 2 17 Judges enforcing a new regime
would face even greater demands than under current law to distinguish between "significant" agency policy statements that require fullblown process and those that do not. Clearly, not every piece of paper
that an agency publicly issues regarding its programs and policies
should be subjected to notice-and-comment rulemaking. Thus,
judges would be presented with a difficult question of degree. As
John Manning has argued, judicial reluctance under current law to
"impose even a mild rulemaking obligation upon agencies may reflect
judicial administrability concerns similar to those that deter judges
from enforcing the nondelegation doctrine." 2 18 Manning argues that
"[judges] should hesitate before invalidating a nonlegislative rule on
the ground that it reflects an impermissible degree of policymaking
outside the process of notice-and-comment rulemaking."' 2 19 He
reaches this conclusion because the inquiry "turns on distinguishing
interpretation from policymaking," a difficult question because the
2 20
two are typically so intertwined.
C.

More Palatable Proposals
1.

Citizens' Right to Petition

An intermediate, process-focused solution might offer another
option. Along the lines of section 553(e) of the APA, which authorizes petitions to revise or repeal agency rules, citizens could be entitled to receive notice of a guidance document's issuance and to
petition the agency to revise or repeal the document (assuming the
agency has not already complied with section 553's notice and comSee supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 118, at 86; Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible
Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 429, 440-41 (1999); cf
Strauss, supra note 34, at 808 ("Particularly in a society that has come to believe standards
are a better instrument of regulation than detailed command-and-control rules, even an
ideal level of rulemaking will generate an enormous range of issues on which interpretation and policy analysis will be required."). But see KERWIN, supra note 179, at 174 ("[A]ny
clarification [in marginal cases] will have the effect of transforming a gray area into one
that is black and white, and this change alone may be enough to trigger a protest.").
217
See, e.g., Manning, supra note 11, at 896.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 914.
220
Id. at 916.
215

216
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ment procedures). 2 2' The agency would have a limited time to respond substantively, say, 180 days. In response, the agency could
modify the guidance document or give reasons why the document
should not be changed. 2 22 To avoid the specter of multiple successive
petitions on a single document, the agency could publish a notice inviting citizens to file all related petitions within a limited period. 223
The statute should also bar pro forma petitions by clearly requiring a
petitioner to submit significant supporting facts or arguments. Onjudicial review, an agency could defend itself by arguing that the submission did not require a substantive response. The agency could also
respond by publishing the guidance for a full notice-and-comment
proceeding, which would have the advantage of flushing out any other
guidance detractors. 224 As with other such petitions, the agency's response, or its failure to respond by a statutory deadline, would be sub225
ject to judicial review.
No similar right appears to exist under current law. Despite some
commentators' statements that the language of the APA supplies an
obvious right to file such a petition under section 553,226 the few
221
The Administrative Conference of the United States's recommendation for a posteffective date comment period for nonlegislative rules (coupled with pre-adoption noticeand-comment for significant rules) has some similarities. See I C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1992).
Like a petition process, the recommendation would require the agency to respond to comments on the guidance document after issuing it. These comments would be closer in time
to the guidance's issuance. It is unclear whether that would make the agency more willing
to consider the comments, since there would have been less reliance on the guidance, or
less willing, on the theory that the agency would be unwilling to revisit a decision to which
it had just committed. In addition, the recommendation would apply to all guidances
unless the agency explained why a comment period would not be in the public interest.
That process would likely burden the agency more than a petition process.
222 The proposal should confirm that an agency can revise a guidance document or
interpretive rule without notice-and-comment rulemaking, thereby overruling the D.C. Circuit holdings on interpretive rules in Alaska Profl Hunters Ass'n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030,
1033-35 (D.C. Cir. 1999) and Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 587
(D.C. Cir. 1997). These holdings have been subject to considerable criticism. See, e.g.,
Michael Asimow & Robert A. Anthony, A Second Opinion? Inconsistent Interpretive Rules, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 2000, at 16; RichardJ. PierceJr., DistinguishingLegislative Rules
from Interpretive Rules, 52 ADnMIN. L. REV 547, 563-66 (2000); Strauss, supra note 34, at
809-11 (advocating "free revision" of publication rules).
223 1 am grateful to Jonathan Molot for proposing this solution to the problem of successive petitioning. The statute could nonetheless permit a later petition if it is based on
grounds arising after the initial petitioning period.
224 For example, the D.C. Circuit will generally not consider an argument raised in
opposition to a rule unless it has been raised in the rulemaking proceeding. See, e.g., Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 429 F.3d 1136,
1148-50 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
225
Cf Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety, 429 F.3d at 1144-45 (discussing the timing
of petitions filed pursuant to a Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration notice-andcomment procedure).
226 See Michael Asimow, California UndergroundRegulations, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 43, 44 n.5
(1992); Asimow, supra note 11, at 424 & n.225 (suggesting that the public can petition to
repeal or amend a nonlegislative rule under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)); William V. Luneberg, Peti-
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courts to opine on the issue have flatly and unanimously disagreed,
finding that no right to petition an agency to revise or repeal an interpretive rule or policy statement exists under current law. 227 A petition
process would confer several advantages on regulatory beneficiaries.
First, a regulatory beneficiary could engage an agency on the substance of a guidance document. The agency would be obligated to
respond in a reasoned way, including disclosing data relevant to the
arguments. This obligation would parallel an agency's obligations to
respond to significant comments in rulemaking 2 28 or, in an enforcement action, to defend its position against a regulated entity's challenges. 2 29 Requiring an agency to supply coherent reasons for its
guidances in response to petitions would in turn make judicial review
of these documents more effective.
tioning FederalAgencies for Rulemaking: An Overview of Administrative andJudicial Practiceand
Some Recommendations for Improvement, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 1, 13-14.
Section 553 of the APA contains poorly drafted language exempting guidance documents from rulemaking requirements:
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does
not apply(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice ....
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000) (emphasis added). Read plainly, that provision might seem to
exempt guidance documents only from 553(b), the notice requirements, since the language exempts guidances only from "this subsection" and not from 553(e), the subsection
that provides the petition right. On the other hand, courts have uniformly read the language to exempt guidance documents not only from the notice requirements of 553(b)
but also from the comment and "concise general statement" requirements of a different
subsection, 553(c). See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 196-97 (1993). Therefore,
"subsection" should be read as a scrivener's error, and the correct reference should be
"section." In that case, the best reading of the exemption in 553(b) is that it applies to all
of 553, including 553(e).
227 See Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1994)
(en banc) ("[I]nterested parties do not have the right to petition the agency for review of
its interpretive rulings as they do with respect to agency rules.") (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(e));
Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 128 (D.D.C.
2003) ("Section 553, by its terms, does not apply 'to interpretive rules, general statements
of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice' unless notice or hearing
is required by statute." (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(e))), affd on other grounds, 366 F.3d 930,
948 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United Transp. Union v. Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 977 F. Supp. 570,
574 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("In addition, interested parties do not have the right to petition
the agency for review of its interpretive rulings as they do with respect to agency rules.")
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)).
Even if section 553(e)'s right to petition did apply to guidance documents, it imposes
no time limitations upon an agency's response to a petition. Administrative Procedure Act
legislative history suggests that Congress meant for agencies to resolve section 553(e) petitions "promptly," but that language is not in the statute, and courts thus far have read no
meaningful deadline into section 553(e).
228
Cf., e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir.
1977) (discussing the necessity of disclosing scientific data to commenters in a notice-andcomment process).
229 See Levin, supra note 58, at 1500 ("The essence of the agency's duty... should be
an obligation to allow the challenger to present a case, and second, to respond meaningfully to that case.").
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Petitioning might also prompt agencies to identify more significant and controversial policies earlier, as well as to use a more thorough, participatory process for these policies. The agency might
consult with a wider array of interest groups in order to forestall later
petitions or, on the most significant issues, might elect notice-andcomment rulemaking. As argued above, broader consultation may affect the substance of an agency policy. Regulatory beneficiaries, like
regulated entities, will likely value the entitlement to express their
views to the agency and to participate in the policymaking process. 23 0
Compared with a requirement to use notice-and-comment
rulemaking for all nontrivial matters of policy, enforcing a petition
process requirement would raise fewer issues of judicial competence. 23 1 The inquiry on judicial review would be a familiar one: Is
the agency's decision as formulated in the guidance arbitrary and capricious? Has the agency considered the relevant factors, including
any relevant information and arguments presented by petitioners? Is
the agency's policy authorized by statute? Does the agency's decision
2 2
represent a clear error of judgment? 1
This proposal could raise some concerns. Most important is cost,
especially if expenses were high enough to compel agencies to substantially cut back on issuing policies. How costly a petition process
might be is, of course, an empirical question. The costs would be a
function of the number of petitions and the amount of agency resources required to resolve each petition, including any later litigation
over the agency's response. The worst-case scenario would be a revision petition or multiple successive petitions regarding each of the
vast number of agency guidance documents, followed by significant
litigation. In this scenario, the costs are potentially overwhelming. 233
230 See KERWIN, supra note 179, at 189 (noting that interest groups highly value the
opportunity to participate in notice-and-comment rulemaking). See generally Adler, supra
note 121.
231
Cf notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
232 See, e.g.,
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-59 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 408-22 (1971); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
233 Agencies already spend a considerable portion of their rulemaking budgets on
meeting statutory deadlines, often under court order. See, e.g.,
Robert Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail in NationalPark Establishment Legislation and Its Relationship to Pollution
Control Law, 74 DENy. U. L. REv. 779, 799 (1997) ("The EPA priorities are now so driven by
meeting congressional deadlines that the agency cannot comprehensively plan effectively
to implement broad goals, such as reducing exposure to contaminants that generate the
greatest health risks."); Natalie M. Henry, Resources Panel to Review FWS, NOAA Budget Requests, ENVT & ENERGY DAILY, Apr. 30, 2001 (reporting that the fiscal year 2001 budget for
listing and critical habitat was depleted after only two months due to litigation-driven deadlines); Water Quality and Wetlands: Clean Water Act, 2002 A.B.A. SEC. ENV'T, ENERCY, & RESOURCES (YEAR IN REV. 2001) 356, 369 ("In practice, review [under the Clean Water Act

effluent limitation guidelines] occurs much less frequently, and in recent years, the
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The costs associated with these petitions, however, would still
surely be lower than the cost of across-the-board rulemaking. In fact,
petitions would be unlikely for the vast number of truly routine guidance documents aimed at regulated entities and those that simply
boil down statutory or regulatory requirements or give uncontroversial compliance examples. Barring pro forma petitions and requiring
an agency to solicit all related petitions and resolve them simultaneously would also likely cut petitioning costs. An attorneys' fee award
for truly unfounded petitions could perhaps further reduce such
costs.
Another potential concern is that by the time a petition is filed,
the agency decision-making process would already have concluded.
Consequently, an agency might not be truly open-minded and willing
to revisit its earlier decision, preventing a regulatory beneficiary from
effectively engaging the agency in a meaningful dialogue on its policy.
Nonetheless, the petition process would likely improve upon the
status quo for regulatory beneficiaries. First, the existence of a petition right would encourage an agency to consider a wider range of
views before issuing guidances. Second, the potential for meaningful
judicial review of the agency's response would encourage an agency to
thoughtfully consider each petition. While an agency's commitment
to its proposed policy might render petitioning less effective, the petition process would still provide a participation opportunity equivalent
to that afforded in notice-and-comment rulemaking. Although the
agency might have committed to a limited set of policy alternatives at
the time a proposed rule is published, for example, 23 4 an agency
would still need to demonstrate that it had directly responded to the
regulatory beneficiary's concern.
A third potential concern is that a petition process could increase
the influence of regulated entities as well as regulatory beneficiaries.
Compared with regulated entities, regulatory beneficiary organizations are comparatively disadvantaged. An agency also could spend
more time responding to petitions from regulated entities than those
from regulatory beneficiaries. 23 5 This would cause the agency to seek
regulated entity participation earlier in the process. Consequently, as
agency's priorities and schedules for reviewing effluent limitation guidelines have been
driven largely by court-imposed consent decrees.").
234
See, e.g., Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8J. PUB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY, 245, 261-62 (1998) (noting that in most rulemakings analyzed agencies tend to side with those who supported
their initial rule); West, supra note 63, at 69 (summarizing data suggesting that most notices of proposed rulemaking articulated "tentative conclusions" to policy problems rather
than "open-ended solicitations of policy recommendations").
235
On the other hand, some regulated entities may moderate their petitions or refrain
from filing in order to maintain a good long-term relationship with the agency.
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with informal consultation, political access, and, at times, judicial review, 236 the petition process might unevenly benefit regulated
23 7
entities.
That better-funded, better-organized parties might make better
use of a process open to all is hardly surprising. Others have proposed ways to rectify this resource imbalance. 23 8 Whether this is a serious indictment of the proposal depends on how we understand the
agency decision-making process. (After all, no one is suggesting closing the courts altogether because the wealthy can better avail themselves of judicial review.) If agencies just added up the number of
expressed interests in deciding which policies to select, and if all regulated entities had already had an adequate opportunity to participate
absent a petition process-both dubious assumptions-then creating
yet another opportunity for regulated entities might exacerbate the
existing imbalance with little benefit for regulatory beneficiaries.
On balance, however, a formal petitioning opportunity is likely to
help regulatory beneficiaries by enabling them to engage the agency
with significant arguments. The prospect of a petition would encourage an agency to seek input earlier from a broader array of
groups, an especially valuable change if the agency decision-making
process is seen as at least partly deliberative. 239 Thus, the petition
right would require an agency to consider new substantive viewpoints,
240
including those of regulatory beneficiaries, in its policy decisions.
Moreover, if an agency became overwhelmed by extensive petitions on
a controversial issue from regulated entities and decided instead to
236 See, e.g., Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combatingthe Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1443 (2005) (noting imbalance of resources favoring
regulated entities in regulatory litigation); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After
Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 669 (1985) ("Often political remedies are more
readily used by well-organized members of regulated classes than by regulatory beneficiaries, who must overcome substantial barriers to the exercise of political power.").
237
See, e.g., Golden, supra note 234, at 245, 255 (noting that among randomly selected
Clinton-era rulemakings, EPA and NHTSA rulemakings had "extremely limited participation by public interest or citizen advocacy groups," while HUD commenters included citizen advocacy groups and individual citizens).
238
See AvREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 122, at 82.
239
See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing the civic republican and
neopluralist visions of the administrative state).
240
Another concern about a petition process is that citizens with a narrow view of the
public interest, rather than a democratically accountable agency, might somehow drive
policymaking priorities. Commentators have raised similar concern over statutory provisions contemplating Labor Department responses to individual opinion letter requests and
granting a safe harbor for operation in compliance with a position taken in an opinion
letter. See, e.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 211-13 (2006)
(discussing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000)). Here, however, no petition could be filed unless the agency has already selected an issue for its agenda by issuing
a guidance document.
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use notice-and-comment rulemaking, this would also have substantial
benefits for regulatory beneficiaries.
2.

Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking for "Important"Policy Decisions

This proposal is a more palatable variant of the previously discussed proposal calling for notice-and-comment rulemaking for all
guidances. It would require notice-and-comment rulemaking not for
every new policy decision but only for "important" policy decisions.
The agency would be subject to the corresponding obligations to
make the policy binding, to disclose data, to respond to comments,
24 1
and to be subject to judicial review.

This proposal would be less costly and cumbersome than a more
expansive rulemaking requirement. For the policies subject to this
rulemaking requirement, regulatory beneficiaries could engage the
agency more effectively and obtain judicial review. This would in turn
prompt the agency to reason through the policy more carefully.
While regulated entities still might file more comments, chances are
good that regulatory beneficiary views would receive more attention in
a comment process than through informal consultation on a
24 2
guidance.
However, such a policy would still place a difficult burden on

2 43
judges to distinguish the "important" policies from the other ones.

By comparison, when courts currently decide whether a guidance is
actually a rule, they focus largely on whether the policy is effectively
binding. 24 4 That approach overlooks nonbinding policies that should
have been issued by rulemaking because they evoke a significant
change in behavior among regulated entities and meet some level of
"significance." On the other hand, the focus on the binding quality of
an agency statement represents a standard that judges can readily
apply.
Cf Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
Susan Yackee and Jason Yackee have presented an effective empirical analysis suggesting that agencies respond disproportionately to business comments filed in rulemaking. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy,68J. POL. 128 (2006). However, the Yackees
do not compare the level of responsiveness in rulemaking to other agency decision-making
methods, such as informal consultation. See id. Rulemaking is still likely to supply regulatory beneficiaries with a greater opportunity to be heard than informal consultation.
243 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 34, at 811-12 (suggesting that rulemaking requirements
for guidances could impose upon courts the task of deciding that a particular rule is "insufficiendy specific," and "fail [s] to articulate important policy conclusions it could reasonably
have been expected to reach").
244 See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that
FDA action levels are legislative rules subject to notice-and-comment requirements because
they are binding).
241

242
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Determining whether a policy is "important," however, would not
only require a judge to distinguish interpretation from policymaking,
but would also have to be done in the context of the particular program. The risk is that judges would be unwilling to apply the standard
of requiring
with any stringency, undermining the 2 effectiveness
45
broader notice-and-comment rulemaking.
The other moderate alternatives may be superior in this respect.
In the petition process, an affected party could engage the agency
with a nonfrivolous argument on any guidance or policy that the affected party perceives to be significant. Judicial review would be confined to familiar issues of review of agency action. Similarly, the "good
guidance practices" approach below would permit an agency, rather
than a judge, to identify the controversial or significant policy decisions that require a higher degree of process.
3.

Guidances as Precedent

Strauss and Manning have both discussed another intermediate
solution: allowing courts to treat published agency guidance documents as precedent. 2 46 Under this view, an agency would have to supply a reason for departing from a position taken in a guidance
document. While courts could apply this approach more easily than
having to identify "significant" or "important" agency policies that
would be subject to rulemaking, the proposal is largely unhelpful
from the perspective of the regulatory beneficiary.
The Strauss and Manning proposals primarily benefit the regulated entity facing an agency enforcement action. To return to the
FDA's patulin guidance stating that apple juice with more than 50 ppb
patulin will be considered "adulterated," suppose an apple juice
maker ships juice with 45 ppb patulin in interstate commerce. The
FDA brings an enforcement action, arguing despite the guidance that
245 See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing Manning's argument that
judicial hesitation to apply even a "mild" rulemaking requirement reflects doubts about
judicial competence).
246
See Manning, supra note 11, at 929-37; Strauss, supra note 34, at 843-49. Strauss
more clearly specifies that guidance documents would have precedential effect for agencies. Thus, agencies would be required to justify any departure from them, but courts
would not. Strauss makes clear, for example, that agency counsel should not attempt to
argue that the mere violation of a policy in a guidance document warrants fines but should
instead focus on the violation of the underlying binding statute or regulation. Id. at
843-44. Manning suggests that agencies could rely directly on a guidance document if the
document contained "reasoning adequate to support the adjudicative decision." Manning,
supra note 11, at 933-34. While a court could thus consider challenges to agency reasoning in the context of an enforcement action, this approach would nonetheless increase the
difficulties faced by regulatory beneficiaries. Such an approach would not prompt agencies to consult widely on their policies. Moreover, because of the precedential value a
court might accord a guidance, regulated entities are more likely to follow its terms, further reducing judicial review of the policy it embodies.
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45 ppb patulin should be considered to render the juice adulterated.
Rather than treat the guidance document as nonbinding according to
its terms, Strauss and Manning would permit the producer to argue
that the agency must be held to the terms of the guidance, and the
enforcement action dismissed, unless the agency can provide reasons
for deviating. Thus, the FDA would have to explain why 45 ppb
should be seen as adulterated, given its earlier, presumably reasoned
position in the guidance.
This proposal would increase the consistency of agency behavior
and permit greater reliance on agency statements by regulated entities. However, the approach implicitly presumes that the guidance
itself is valid and has properly implemented the social policy that the
statute embodies. It thus does comparatively little for regulatory beneficiaries, who have no opportunity to argue that the choice of 50 ppb
is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute's language or goals of
24 7
protecting public health.

Regulatory beneficiaries would receive no new opportunity to
make such arguments if the agency adhered to the policy in an enforcement action. This approach would also presumably not increase
the ripeness or reviewability of these documents on direct review,
since the document would remain formally nonbinding.2 48 Indeed,
assigning precedential value to guidance documents could result in
courts according these statements even greater deference than under
current law.
Even if beneficiaries agreed with the position taken in the guidance document, the beneficiary could not require an agency to bring
an enforcement action in accordance with its (nonbinding) guidance.
A decision to refrain from enforcement is generally unreviewable. 2 49
However, where an agency's primary function is not to enforce
regulatory standards, but instead to manage a resource, according a
guidance document precedential effect would conceivably serve the
247
Manning recognizes this position in his statement that an agency should be permitted to rely on a guidance document in an adjudication only if the guidance document is
"reasoned." See Manning, supra note 11, at 933-34. A party could thus argue in enforce-

ment litigation that the agency position is unreasoned. See id. However, this does not
resolve whether a court would permit a regulatory beneficiary to intervene to challenge the
reasoning of a guidance document. Moreover, such an opportunity would exist only if the
agency brought enforcement litigation, the prospect of which would be further reduced if
a guidance document had precedential value. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying
text (discussing the difficulty of intervention for regulatory beneficiaries).
248
See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining judicial review for regulatory beneficiaries). Strauss suggests that courts should find that "centrally generated publication rules likely to significantly affect private conduct are ordinarily 'final agency action'
subject, if ripe, to judicial review." Strauss, supra note 34, at 811. However, this does not
seem a significant change from current law. See id. at 819 (suggesting that staff level guidances could not be considered "final"); supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
249
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985).
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interests of regulatory beneficiaries. For example, the beneficiaries of
public land might be able to obtain review of the final action of the
land management agency. These beneficiaries could argue that the
agency action should be vacated because the agency had failed to provide a reasonable justification for acting at variance with the guidance
250
document.
4. Agency Self-Regulation and Good Guidance Practices
Another moderate proposal would require agencies to devise
more inclusive guidance development procedures, such as the FDA's
Good Guidance Practices or the EPA's Public Involvement Policy. 25 1

The OMB Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, issued in January, 2007,252 for example, requires agencies to gather comment for
"significant" guidance documents, 253 by which 0MB means circumstances in which an agency provides "important policy direction on a
broad scale."'2

54

Under the FDA's Good Guidance Practices, the

agency must solicit comment before issuing a so-called "Level 1
255
guidance."
For most guidances, the agency is only obligated to accept comments; it need not offer a public response. 25 6 Like the guidance-asprecedent approach, 25 7 the FDA's Good Guidance Practices and the
OMB Bulletin also include a conformity norm. That is, agency employees' actions must conform to the terms of a guidance unless there
250
Similarly, if the agency issued a guidance helpful to beneficiaries regarding when it
would license a particular activity, a beneficiary could challenge a license that did not conform to the guidance's requirements.
251
See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's Public Involvement Policy).
252
See Memorandum of Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 18.
253
See id. at 19 (defining "significant" guidance documents as those anticipated to
have a $100 million or greater annual effect upon the economy, to materially alter rights
and obligations of entitlement recipients, or to raise novel legal or policy issues).
254
Id. at 11.
255
See supra text accompanying note 174.
256 The FDA Good Guidance Practices require no response to comments. See Administrative Practices and Procedures: Good Guidance Practices, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,468, 56,470
(Sept. 19, 2000). For most guidance documents, the OMB bulletin does not require response either. See Memorandum of Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, supra note 18, § III.2.a (stating that no response to comments is required); id.
§ VI (stating that the bulletin creates no enforceable rights). Section LV, which would
require an agency to take public comment on an economically significant guidance document prior to issuance, does require a response to comments. See id. §§ IV.l.iii-iv. However, it is unclear whether OMB would review the agency guidance document for
compliance with this requirement. See supra text accompanying note 79 (discussing Executive Order 13,422). Meanwhile, the bulletin imposes no binding obligation that could
raise the prospect ofjudicial review. See Memorandum of Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 18, § VI.
257
See supra Part II.C.3.
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is an "appropriate justification" for deviation accompanied by supervi2 58
sory review.
These sorts of practices do provide regulatory beneficiaries with a
greater opportunity to submit comments on a proposed guidance to
the agency. This in turn would increase the information available to
the agency about any relevant technical issues and public preferences.
Further, a beneficiary could comment on a guidance document in
draft form rather than waiting until issuance.
However, these proposals for improved self-government still retain important shortcomings. First, because agencies need not respond to comments, these proposals do not ensure that the agency
will meaningfully engage the comments it receives. Comments from
an entity with significant political clout will, of course, receive attention, as such comments would have in any event. Although well-intentioned civil servants will undoubtedly endeavor to read comments
from other sources, the lack of a response obligation, combined with
time and resource constraints, make these proposals less likely to address the concerns of regulatory beneficiaries. Research has not
turned up any reports on whether the FDA's Good Guidance Practices
have prompted public participation or affected the content of FDA
decisions. 259 Further, although the FDA procedures have been codified in a binding legislative rule, no reported judicial opinions address
the FDA's compliance with the procedures. 260
Second, the conformity norm included in the FDA's Good Guidance Practices does not fully address critical concerns of regulatory
beneficiaries. As discussed above, beneficiaries still receive no new opportunity to argue that the policy in the guidance does not adequately
26 1
implement the statutory goals.

Although the OMB's bulletin would go a step beyond the FDA's
Good Guidance Practices, it also is unlikely to address regulatory beneficiary concerns. One aspect helpful to regulatory beneficiaries is the
258 See Memorandum of Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 18, § II.l.b. The OMB proposal also requires an agency to accept comment on a guidance at any time, including comments suggesting revision or
reconsideration. See id. § III.2.a.
259
The FDA did report in 2000, based on an undisclosed "informal internal survey,"
that "[Good Guidance Practices] have generally been beneficial and effective in standardizing the agency's procedures for development, issuance, and use of guidance documents,
and that FDA employees have generally been following GGP's." See Administrative Practices and Procedures: Good Guidance Practices, 65 Fed. Reg. 7321, 7322-23 (Feb. 14,
2000). However, the FDA did not discuss public participation and has provided no further
details.
260
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 371(h)(5) (West 1999) (lacking any notes of cases under this
statute requiring the FDA to codify good guidance practices); id. (West Supp. 2006)
(same).
261
See supra Part II.C.3.
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Bulletin's requirement that an agency respond to comments on "economically significant" guidances and those that "adversely affect in a
material way the economy or a sector of the economy." 26 2 0MB expects economically significant guidances, which are those with an anticipated annual economic effect of $100 million or more, to
represent only a "relatively narrow" subcategory of significant guidances, however. 26 3 For all other guidances, the agency would retain
26 4
the choice whether to provide notice and comment opportunities.
Further, as with the FDA's Good Guidance Practices, even this
aspect of the new Bulletin privileges regulated entity interests over
those of regulatory beneficiaries. Agencies are to respond to comments on "economically significant" guidances and those with an adverse economic effect.26 5 These are likely to include guidance
documents that prompt significant or expensive increases in regulated

entity responsibility. Agencies would not, however, have to respond to
comments on guidances likely to be of greater interest to regulatory
beneficiaries-those that tend to reduce economic burdens by reducing regulatory compliance burdens or that generate a material adverse effect upon the environment, public health or safety, or local or
tribal governments or communities.
Moreover, an agency that failed to take or respond to comments
on guidance documents would be accountable only to OMB. The
OMB's Good Guidance Practices would not create rights enforceable
in courts. 2 66 OMB review alone is not likely to be particularly helpful
to regulatory beneficiaries. Lisa Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh
have recently presented historical evidence suggesting that OMB's
26 7
tendency is to intercede on behalf of regulated entities.
262 Memorandum of Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
supra note 18, at 9.
263 See id. (noting that the definition of "economically significant guidance document"
includes only a relatively narrow category of significant guidance documents).
264 See id. (stating that agencies may determine which guidance documents "merit advance notice-and-comment and a response-to-comments document" and which do not); id.
at 18 (noting that while post-promulgation notice and comment is encouraged, an agency
is not required to provide it if such procedures are not "feasible or appropriate").
265
Id. at § 1.5. By comparision, a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12,866, which is subject to OMB review, includes any regulatory action with a material
adverse effect upon productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or
safety, local or tribal governments or communities. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg.
51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993), reprinted as amended in 6 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).
266 See Memorandum of Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 18, § V.
267 Bressman and Vandenbergh argue further that OMB generally attempts to reduce
the costs of rules and the burdens they place upon regulated entities. See Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A CriticalLook at the
Practice of PresidentialControl, 105 MICH. L. Rv. 47, 74-75 (2006) (arguing, based on interviews with political officials at the EPA, that the OMB tends to undercut regulatory efficiency by consistently interceding in agency processes on behalf of regulated entities).
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Finally, while brand-new Executive Order 13,422 allows OMB to
request consultation with an agency prior to its issuance of any "significant" guidance document, 268 it is unclear, given OMB's resource constraints and small staff, how frequently OMB will choose to invoke that
authority. Again, OMB consultation may not be particularly responsive to the concerns of regulatory beneficiaries.
Rakoff has suggested that placing the agency's obligation to respond to public comment (or to comply with its policies) "beyond the
purview of the courts" may matter little either to the agency or to regulated industry. 269 For example, regulated entities participated extensively in the development of the Good Guidance Practices. 270 The
relationship between the FDA and businesses in this "highly regulated
industry" involves "repeat players," 2 7 1 fostering greater cooperation
without judicial review.
As I suggest above, however, where regulatory beneficiaries lack a
direct relationship with an agency, they also may lack the "repeat
player" relationship that prompts the agency to seek their views or
engage their comments.

272

In that case, a regulatory beneficiary

would likely benefit substantially from the ability to invoke judicial review or other methods of external oversight. Then the agency would
be accountable for attending to the views of the regulatory
beneficiary.
In short, the opportunity to comment provided by agency selfregulation efforts is helpful. But without judicial review or some similar opportunity to hold agencies accountable for taking regulatory
beneficiaries' concerns into account, self-regulation, under the new
OMB Bulletin or otherwise, is unlikely to fully address those concerns.
5.

Expanding Citizen Suits

Another proposal encourages regulatory beneficiaries to use citizen suits or other private enforcement suits to obtain judicial review of
an agency's policy choice. While citizen suit provisions are common
in environmental laws governing pollution, they are rare in other conNicholas Bagley and Richard Revesz have also argued persuasively that "many of the features of OMB review create a profound institutional bias against regulation." See Bagley &
Revesz, supra note 198, at 1262. But see Croley, supra note 206, at 874-75 (arguing that
regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries have equivalent access to the OMB). Further, the disadvantages regulatory beneficiaries face in the agency setting may also impede
their ability to gain assistance from the OMB as agencies develop guidance documents. See
supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
268
See Exec. Order 13,422, supra note 79.
269
Rakoff, supra note 3, at 169.
270
See id.
271
Id. at 169-70. But see Golden, supra note 234, at 263 (noting the absence of "repeat
players" in eleven randomly selected NHTSA, EPA, and HUD rulemakings).
272 See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
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texts. 273 Indeed, even in the context of environmental laws, citizen
suits face significant statutory and constitutional limits. 27 4 Outside the
securities and civil rights contexts, private rights of action are infre275
quently implied.
Regulatory beneficiaries' concerns over inadequate agency enforcement of statutory provisions could be addressed by expanding
citizen enforcement provisions to encompass obligations under a
broader array of health, safety, and environmental laws. Moreover,
broadening the availability of citizen suits would increase regulatory
beneficiaries' ability to hold agencies externally accountable for their
implementation of a statute. Regulatory beneficiaries could use these
enforcement actions as a vehicle for litigating the interpretation of
the underlying statute or regulation. To the extent a citizen suit defendant relies upon an agency interpretation or position (such as one
contained in a guidance), the regulatory beneficiary could obtain judicial review without first having to go to the agency. 2 76 The agency
would have to present its position to the court either indirectly,
through its guidance document, or directly, through an amicus brief.
Admittedly, a regulatory beneficiary could obtain judicial review
of the agency position only in the context of an enforcement action
against a third party, which would require a statutory or regulatory
violation that the regulatory beneficiary could detect and document.
273
A January 2007 Westlaw search of the United States Code Annotated for "citizen
suits," "citizen enforcement," or "private enforcement" turned up only twenty-five provisions authorizing suits against private parties. Nineteen of these concerned environmental
or energy-use issues. But see 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (2000) (product safety); id. § 2102 ("hobby
protection"); 49 U.S.C. § 14707 (2000) (registration requirements for transportation
providers).
274
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 175 (2000)
(applying standing doctrine to citizen suits); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523
U.S. 83, 107-08 (1998) (same); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S.
49, 64-66 (1987) (requiring citizen suits under the Clean Water Act to allege continuing
or repeated violations).
275
See Bradford C. Mank, CanAdministrative Regulations Interpret Rights Enforceable Under
Section 1983? Why Chevron Deference Survives Sandoval and Gonzaga, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
843, 853 & n.64 (2005) (listing examples of implied private rights of action); Susan J.
Stabile, The Role of CongressionalIntent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of
Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 861, 866-67 & nn.32, 34 (1996) (suggesting that apart from
the securities area, courts are reluctant to imply private rights of action); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 100, at 1206; Michael A. Mazzuchi, Note, Section 1983 and Implied Rights of
Action: Rights, Remedies, and Realism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1062, 1074-78 (1992).
276
Even in direct review of an agency rule, courts now require presentation of the
issue to the agency first. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Further, the court would likely apply Skidmore deference when reviewing an agency interpretation not contained in a notice-and-comment rule or formal adjudication. See United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001). But see Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (stating that agency interpretations are "entitled to respect," but
only to the extent that they are persuasive (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944))).
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Further, such lawsuits would be subject to resource constraints. Filing
a lawsuit is considerably more expensive than submitting comments or
filing a petition with receptive agency officials.
The proposal also has other, more significant shortcomings. An
expansion of citizen enforcement schemes is unlikely to be politically
viable in the current climate, which seems adverse to litigation. Even
current citizen suit provisions raise significant constitutional issues
under Articles II and III of the U.S. Constitution. 27 7 Finally, these
provisions may interfere with an enforcement agency's legitimate
weighing of a "wide variety of... managerial, political, and substantive
27 8
considerations" in deciding whether to bring a claim.
CONCLUSION

The debate over agency guidance documents to date has been
incomplete because scholars have neglected the interests of regulatory
beneficiaries. When an agency chooses to issue a policy in a guidance
document rather than a rule, regulatory beneficiaries lose the crucial
ability to participate in the agency decision and to obtain judicial review of it. This occurs even though the agency may be implementing
statutes that Congress enacted to help the beneficiaries. Consequently, regulatory beneficiaries should have greater procedural
rights with respect to agency policymaking. Further empirical research is warranted regarding issues such as agency efforts to include
regulatory beneficiaries in their decision making, and the impact, if
any, that comments from outsiders have on agency decision making.
In the meantime, there is a clear need for reform to protect
the interests of regulatory beneficiaries as agencies issue guidance
documents. One or more of the above proposals-creating a right to
petition, providing greater notice-and-comment rulemaking opportunities, or requiring good guidance practices-would better enable
regulatory beneficiaries to engage an agency directly on the substance
of an issued policy statement. Ideally, the solution would include judicial review to hold agencies accountable for complying with the new
procedures. These reforms would also move significantly toward ensuring, more generally, that agency procedures better recognize and
incorporate the legitimate interests of regulatory beneficiaries in
agency policy.

277
See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771-73
(2000) (holding that bounty cannot solve standing problems and identifying Article II issues with citizen enforcement); see also supra note 274 (citing other standing cases).
278 Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 100, at 1210.

HeinOnline -- 92 Cornell L. Rev. 452 2006-2007

